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1 .
This thesis examines the inefficiencies which arise from decentralised 
policy making in an interdependent world economy. Policy making is 
modelled as a non-cooperative, non-zero sum game between economies.
Each economy is assumed to have a loss function defined on relevant 
macroeconomic variables. The constraints facing any particular 
economy are determined by the joint action of all the economies. 
Conventional Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts are examined 
for simple comparative static models. These solution concepts are 
then extended to models in which the constraint set has a dynamic 
structure. It is demonstrated that even when countries can agree on 
ultimate targets policy will still be inefficient because of sub- 
optimal choices of convergent paths to steady-state. A simple macro- 
economic model of an interdependent world economy is used to demonstrate 
this analytically. This is followed by numerical simulations of a more 
general model. Although the inefficiency discussed above is clearly 
present it appears to be numerically small suggesting that some ultimate 
conflict of interests is necessary for decentralised policy to have 
large welfare effects.
ii
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2Chapter One
Introduction
This thesis has been motivated by an interest in two areas 
of economic theory. These are the theory of the transmission of 
economic disturbances between countries and the use of game theory 
to model the interaction of small groups of agents. A natural 
combination of these interests is the modelling of interacting 
stabilisation policies in an interdependent world economy. This 
is not just of abstract theoretical interest. As I hope to show 
in this introduction, a number of periods of unsatisfactory performance 
in recent economic history can, at least partly, be explained by a 
failure to coordinate policies.
In the post war period there have been two very different 
international monetary systems. The Bretton Woods system was 
conceived during the war,brought into operation shortly after and 
lasted until 1973. This system was characterised by fixed exchange 
rates alterable only in response to 'fundamental disequilibrium' in 
a country's payments position. In 1973 this system was abandoned 
in favour of one of flexible exchange rates though occasionally 
governments have intervened to manipulate the foreign exchange 
market. Both systems have proved to have several disadvantages.
A possible cause of the failure of the Bretton Woods system 
was the asymmetric way in which balance of payments disequilibria 
were treated. Deficit countries were forced to deflate or to 
devalue but there was effectively no sanction on surplus countries 
c.f. Williamson (1977) for a more detailed discussion. Thus fixed 
exchange rates were seen as a severe constraint on the ability of
3a country to pursue a full employment macroeconomic policy. The 
central role of the dollar as the international reserve currency 
also required the U.S. monetary authorities to design policy with 
regard to the demand for world liquidity rather than domestic 
considerations. The conflict between the two understandably 
created difficulties.
It was hoped that the shift to flexible exchange rates would 
relieve both problems by allowing countries to direct policy towards 
full employment targets and at the same time allow the United 
States to pursue an independent monetary policy. The main worry 
was that countries would indulge in the kind of competitive 
depreciation which was a feature of the inter-war floating period.
The danger of this is that the resulting instability of exchange 
rates could act as a disincentive to trade. In actual fact, although 
exchange rates have proved quite volatile, competitive depreciation 
does not seem to have been a major problem. Indeed the reverse 
seems to have been the case as countries have appreciated their 
currencies to combat inflation as the policy emphasis has shifted 
from unemployment.
International factors have therefore been important under 
both systems of exchange rates. The reasons why floating the exchange 
rate have not led to the desired decoupling of policies are discussed 
in chapter two. A natural question is therefore to what extent 
countries could improve on decentralised outcomes by coordination 
of macroeconomic policy. This question will provide the central 
theme of this thesis.
4The plan of the thesis is as follows. Chapter two provides 
a survey of the literature on the transmission of economic policy 
between countries. This begins with the small open-economy case 
and moves on to consider models of interdependence. It is shown 
that as models have become more general they have come to concentrate 
more on dynamic adjustment through time rather than comparative 
static equilibria. Chapter three discusses policy optimisation 
among a small group of agents. The solution concepts of game theory 
are set out in a general form and are then used to analyse a simple 
two-country game using the Mundell fixed price model. Chapter four 
generalises the problem to the case where the state variables have 
a dynamic structure by setting out solution concepts for differential 
games. This enables two sources of inefficiency from uncoordinated 
policy to be contrasted. The first of these results from incompatibility 
of targets adopted by agents. The second is due to an inefficient 
choice of adjustment path even when targets are mutually compatible. 
Chapter five considers the problem of bringing down inflation in a 
two country model using the techniques of chapter four. The emphasis 
in this chapter is on obtaining general analytical results.
Unfortunately this requires the use of a very simplified economic 
model to keep the problem tractable. Chapter six examines a less 
restrictive model by use of numerical simulation. Both chapters five 
and six emphasise real wage resistance as a factor influencing the 
transmission of inflation from one country to another.

Chapter Two
(2:1) Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a survey of the 
existing literature on macroeconomic policy in open economies.
There are several ways of going about this. One is to provide a 
chronological account of the development of the theory emphasising 
the various controversies which have arisen. A second is to begin with 
a simple model with highly restrictive assumptions and demonstrate 
the effects of relaxing these assumptions. The approach adopted 
in this chapter is something of a mixture of the two. Simple 
models are specified which capture the spirit of various analyses 
and it is shown that for the most part these simple models can be 
seen as special cases of a more general model. For example, the 
Mundel1-Fleming and monetary models are derived by imposing values 
on the price adjustment coefficient in a more general model.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section (2:2) analyses 
the impact of macroeconomic policy in a small open economy (SOE).
The issues considered will be the effects of the exchange rate 
regime, the degree of capital mobility and the degree of price 
flexibility. In section (2:3) this analysis is extended to the 
case where the economy is large enough to affect world aggregates.
A two country model is specified which can be thought of as a system 
of two large economies or as one large economy facing an amalgam of 
smaller economies. Section (2:4) moves away from the positive 
analysis of the previous sections to consider some normative issues, 
i.e. in what way can the authorities best determine policy to achieve 
their objectives. Section (2:5) contains conclusions.
7(2:2) The effects of policy in an SOE
Modern open economy macroeconomics really begins with the 
extension of the Keynesian multiplier model to incorporate the 
external sector c.f. Machlup (1943). This is a special case of 
the more general fixed-price, Hicksian IS/LM system in which the 
interest elasticity of aggregate expenditure is assumed to be zero. 
Since the IS/LM system is better suited for the analysis of capital 
mobility this framework will be used for the development of the 
Keynesian model.
The closed economy IS/LM system is made up of three markets, 
i.e. those for goods, money and bonds. It is solved by finding 
the interest rate/output combination which simultaneously clears 
the goods and money markets and relying on Walras' law to ensure 
that the bond market clears. The generalisation of the model to 
incorporate an external sector adds a fourth market in the form of 
the market for foreign exchange. Mundell (1963) and Fleming (1962) 
extended the IS/LM model to this four market system. They assumed 
that equilibrium at any point in time corresponds to intersection 
of the IS and LM curves. By Walras' law this implicitly requires 
that any excess demand/supply in the foreign exchange market must 
have as its counterpart excess supply/demand in the bond market.
Analysis of the foreign exchange market usually disaggregates 
transactions into two categories, current and capital account.
The analytical advantage of this is that the determinants of the 
balance on these categories are different. The current account 
balance depends on the level of output at home and in the rest of 
the world and the relative price of domestic and foreign goods while
8the capital account balance is a function of the relative yields 
of domestic and foreign financial assets. Assuming both domestic 
and world prices to be fixed enables the Mundell-Fleming model to 
be summarised by the following set of equations.
(2:1) Y ” Y(r, g, E, A) - IS curve
(2:2) r = r(Y, M) - LM curve
(2:3) R = Ee /B ” C(Y, Y*, E) + K(r, r*, '^) - Reserve changes
(2:4) M = 4* (R + D) - Money Supply
(2:5) D = “ aR - Sterilisation
Notation is as follows:
Y - output
r « rate of interest
E = exchange rate (price of unit of foreign currency)
g " government expenditure
A - all other autonomous expenditures
M - money supply
B - balance of payments
C - current account
K - capital account
R - reserves of foreign currency
D - domestic credit base
* indicates a foreign variable
Consider first the fixed exchange rate case. Assuming that the 
authorities do not intervene to sterilise reserve changes, i’.e.
9D - 0»implies a single source of dynamics in the form of the change in 
the money stock due to an external payments imbalance. This can 
be written:
(2:6) M = <KC(Y, Y*) + K(r, r*))
where $ , the money multiplier, is by definition positive.
Rewriting the IS/LM system as a reduced form, i.e.
(2:1’) Y = Y(r, g, E, A) = Y'(g, M, E, A)
(2:2’) r = r(Y, M) = r ’(g, M, E, A)
enables stability conditions to be derived. Stability requires 
3m
/ 3M < 0 which in turn requires ‘H CYY 'M + Krr,J,) < °* This is
satisfied if all partial derivatives have their expected signs.
The properties of this model are well known. Both fiscal and 
monetary policy generate positive impact effects on output but the 
effects of a monetary expansion are completely eroded by the subsequent 
loss of reserves. There are two possible responses to a fiscal 
expansion.
(1) If C Y' + K r' > 0  then the increase in the rate of interest
Y 8 r g
generates a capital account surplus which more than offsets the 
deterioration in the current balance at the impact equilibrium.
There is therefore a second round monetary expansion which reinforces 
the output increase from the initial fiscal expansion.
(2) If C^Yg + ^rrg < ® then the impact equilibrium exhibits a 
payments deficit. This leads to a loss of reserves which erodes 
some, but not all, of the initial expansionary effects of fiscal 
policy (providing Kf ^ 0).
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Consider now the flexible exchange rate case. Expected 
changes in the exchange rate are assumed to be exogenous, i.e. Ee 
is independent of current variables. Rather than the money stock 
adjusting in response to payments imbalance it is assumed that the 
exchange rate moves to correct the disequilibrium. Assuming a 
partial adjustment mechanism enables the dynamics of the exchange 
rate to be written
(2:7) E = -0(C(Y, Y*, E) + K(r, r*))
where 9, the adjustment coefficient, can either reflect the speed 
of adjustment of the market under a freely floating system or a 
reaction function coefficient of the policy authorities under a 
managed float.
If the adjustment path is stable, then the conventional 
policy results can be derived. Both fiscal and monetary policy 
are effective in increasing output in the short and long run but 
the effectiveness of fiscal policy declines as capital mobility 
increases becoming zero with perfect mobility. Note that if the 
adjustment path involves a non-zero balance of payments it is 
necessary to assume full sterilisation to disentangle the effects 
of policy from subsequent monetary effects.
3 EFor stability /gg < 0 is necessary which requires 
Cg + CyYg + KrTg > 0. This is clearly satisfied if C£ > 0, 
i.e. if the Marshal1-Lerner condition is satisfied. The existence 
of adjustment lags makes Cg < 0 quite a plausible case in the
short-run.
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Several criticisms of the Mundell-Fleming model have been 
put forward as follows:
(1) The most obvious criticism is the assumption of fixed prices.
This can be relaxed by including a Phillips' curve without 
changing the basic insights of the model providing the adjustment
of prices to output is sluggish. Sachs (1980) replaces this assumption 
with that of a fixed real wage. This reverses the conclusion that 
monetary policy is more effective than fiscal policy under flexible 
exchange rates since changes in the nominal exchange rate no longer 
imply changes in the real exchange rate.
(2) Determination of the capital account is specified in flow 
terms. This implies that a net capital inflow can be maintained 
indefinitely by a positive interest differential. A more satisfactory 
approach is to model adjustment towards a desired stock of financial 
assets which is determined by relative yields and risk. This kind
of portfolio model has been made popular by Tobin (1958 and 1968) and 
has been applied to markets in international financial assets by 
Kouri and Porter (1974) and Branson (1981).
(3) The static expectations assumption (i.e. Ee independent of 
current economic variables) is clearly unsatisfactory. Dornbusch (1976) 
replaces it with the assumption of model consistent expectations 
(discussed later in this section). Niehans (1975) argues that 
expectations can be endogenised in such a way as to remove the 
instability problems associated with short-run J curve effects.
The basic argument is that when the Marshall-Lerner condition is 
not satisfied in the short-run a monetary expansion produces a 
deficit on both current and capital accounts. Depreciation is unable 
to correct the current account deficit but may be able to create an
12
offsetting capital inflow if it creates the expectation of a 
subsequent appreciation. This idea of exchange rate overshooting 
in response to monetary policy has since become familiar through 
papers by Dornbusch (1976) and Buiter and Miller (1981).
The Mundell-Fleming model is clearly a Keynesian model in that 
its central concern is the determination of the output level with 
prices assumed exogenous. For a number of years in the late 1960's/ 
early 1970's its chief rival was seen as the 'monetary approach' which 
assumed flexible prices and fixed output c.f. Frenkel and Johnson 
(1976). The stylised features of this model are as follows.
Firstly nominal expenditure is determined by a fixed proportional 
relationship to the money stock. With fixed exchange rates and 
perfect commodity arbitrage prices are determined via the purchasing 
power parity relationship. This determines nominal income since output 
is assumed to be exogenous. The balance of payments is then 
determined as the difference between nominal income and expenditure. 
Changes in the money supply therefore affect the balance of payments 
by changing nominal expenditure but do not affect output or prices.
As in the Mundell-Fleming case the monetary approach to the 
balance of payments can be described in terms of Walras' law. In 
this case there are only two markets to be considered, that for 
money balances and that for foreign currency. An excess supply of 
money necessarily implies an excess demand for foreign currency and 
vice-versa. Thus the two models, under very different assumptions, 
come to the qualitatively similar conclusion that a small country 
in a fixed exchange rate regime cannot pursue an independent 
monetary policy.
In the flexible exchange rate case the monetary approach becomes 
a theory of the exchange rate rather than a theory of the balance 
of payments. The argument here is that monetary expansion results in 
a proportionate increase in the price level which by PPP implies 
a proportionate depreciation of the exchange rate. This implies 
that bilateral exchange rates are determined as the ratio of the 
money stocks in the two countries and the rate of change of the 
exchange rate is given by the difference in the rates of monetary 
growth. More sophisticated versions of the monetary approach to 
the exchange rate can be developed incorporating features such as 
non-traded goods, interest sensitive money demand and productivity 
changes (c.f. Dornbusch and Krugman (1976)) but the basic causal 
factor in exchange rate determination remains monetary policy.
Several detailed critiques of the monetary approach exist 
c.f. Currie (1976) and Hahn (1977). Currie points out that the 
incorporation of additional financial assets into the model eliminates 
the simple identity between monetary expansion and the balance of 
payments. For example, a balance of payments deficit may have as 
its counterpart the issue of bonds by the government to finance its 
budget deficit rather than an excess supply of money with the private 
sector. Both authors argue that the monetary approach relies on 
the strong assumption of fixed output which renders it incapable of 
generating interesting short-run dynamics while its long-run 
properties are consistent with a whole range of less restrictive 
models. In addition to its theoretical shortcomings the monetary 
approach has also suffered the empirical falsification of one of 
the basic hypotheses underlying it in the form of the purchasing 
power parity hypothesis. Frenkel (1980) has documented the poor
14
performance of this hypothesis since the return to floating 
exchange rates in 1973.
By the mid seventies therefore two approaches to modelling 
macroeconomic policy in an open economy had emerged. It would be 
wrong to view them as rivals (though they were viewed as such at the 
time) since they were designed to do different things. The Mundell- 
Fleming model was designed to explain short-run dynamics while the 
monetary approach was designed to explain long-run trends and the 
assumptions underlying the models reflect these purposes. Clearly, 
however, some unification of the theories was desirable if nothing 
else to reduce pointless arguments. Dornbusch (1976) achieved 
this by providing a model which has the theoretically desirable 
property that in the long-run a given increase in the money stock 
will result in an equiproportionate rise in prices and exchange 
rate depreciation but is nevertheless capable of generating short-run 
output dynamics. The Dornbusch model also marked a shift from the view 
that the exchange rate is determined by the relative prices of 
goods as in the monetary model towards the view that the international 
market in financial securities is of prime importance. The model 
is usually expressed as a set of log-linear equations as in (2:8)—(2:11).
( 2 : 8 ) y  =
( 2 : 9 ) m — p
( 2 : 1 0 ) P =
( 2 : 1 1 ) * ee =
u + 6 (e-p) - 6r 
= ky - Xr
TT(y -  y )
r - r*
- IS curve
- LM curve
- Phillips curve
- Uncovered Interest 
Parity
15
Lower case letters denote natural logarithms. All variables 
are as defined previously with the addition of u the shift 
parameter in the IS curve, p the price level and y the natural 
level of output. Equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is 
determined by the requirement that the yields on domestic and foreign 
assets be equal (2:11).
The Dornbusch model provides a significant theoretical advance
on the flexible exchange rate Mundell-Fleming model by remedying
two of the criticisms noted earlier. Firstly it allows prices to
adjust in response to divergences from the natural output level.
The sluggish nature of the adjustment gives rise to short-run
output dynamics. Secondly it replaces the assumption of exogenous or
static expectations concerning exchange rate movements with the
requirement that expectations must be model-consistent or rational.
In a deterministic framework this is equivalent to assuming perfect
foresight on the part of foreign exchange speculators. This feature
gives rise to overshooting of the exchange rate similar to that
considered by Niehans. Consider a monetary expansion. In the long-
run this requires an equiproportionate rise in prices and depreciation
of the exchange rate. However, in the short-run prices are not free
to move instantaneously implying an excess supply of real money
balances and a rate of interest lower than that in the rest of the 
*world. This requires an expected appreciation to maintain the 
Uncovered Interest Parity condition. It is therefore necessary for 
the exchange rate to depreciate to a value below its new equilibrium 
and then to appreciate along the adjustment path.
*  . . . .  , . . .This conclusion is qualified somewhat if output is flexible since
it may rise sufficiently to increase the rate of interest if the 
effect of the short-run exchange rate depreciation is powerful enough.
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Since the publication of Dombusch's 1976 paper a literature 
has grown up around the idea of exchange rate overshooting. A 
thorough discussion of this is almost a thesis in itself but it 
is worthwhile mentioning some significant contributions. Frenkel 
and Rodriguez (1982) showed that the existence of less than perfect 
capital mobility weakened the argument for overshooting. Wilson 
(1979) demonstrated that the expectations formation mechanism 
described by Dornbusch in which model consistency is imposed on 
a regressive expectations coefficient is not equivalent to rational 
expectations when policy shocks are anticipated. Fully rational 
expectations can imply movements in exchange rates which precede 
the actual implementation of policy. Buiter and Miller (1981) 
extended the Dornbusch model to incorporate steady-state inflation 
and used it to analyse recent British macroeconomic performance.
Thus the asset market approach to the exchange rate provides 
the closest thing yet to a unified theory of the macroeconomics of 
the small open economy. Relaxation of the perfect capital mobility 
assumption gives the current account some role to play in exchange 
rate determination without changing the basic insights c.f.
Branson (1981) for a portfolio balance approach. Of course 
important questions remain unanswered. In particular the dynamics 
of wages and prices are badly specified. Therefore an important 
question becomes the extent to which expectations of inflation by 
wage bargainers can be considered rational. However, this issue 
will not be considered here. Instead section (2:3) moves on to 
consider the repercussion effects of policy when the economy 
described is large enough to affect world aggregates.
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(2:3) The transmission of policy in an interdependent world
This section makes use of some simple two-country models to 
analyse the transmission of policy when each country is large 
enough to have a significant effect on the other. The discussion 
will be as follows. First the comparative static results for 
fiscal and monetary policy in the two-country Mundell model will 
be compared with those for the SOE case. This will be followed by 
an extension of the monetary model to the two country case as in 
Dornbusch (1973). Finally some models incorporating sticky prices 
will be discussed. Hamada and Sakurai (1978) analyse the case 
where capital is immobile while Miller (1982) emphasises this 
feature.
Mundell (1968) provides a two country model under the assumption 
of fixed prices. In this development of his model it is also assumed 
that capital is perfectly mobile. This simplifies the analysis 
by ensuring that the rate of interest is equal in the two countries. 
The IS curves can be written in the general form
(2:12) Y = Y(r, G, Y*, E) - Home country IS curve
Y* - Y*(r, G*. Y, E) - Foreign country IS curve
The form of the monetary equilibrium condition depends on 
the exchange rate regime. If exchange rates are fixed then each 
country's money stock is endogenous. Imagine a world in which each 
country creates an initial stock of money but either loses from, or 
adds to, this stock according to whether it runs a balance of 
payments deficit or surplus. Thus the available stock of money is 
distributed between the countries according to their demands.
18
The condition for monetary equilibrium is therefore simply that the 
available world stock of money equals the sum of the demands of 
individual countries.
(2.13) M + M* = M(Y, r) + M*(Y*, r)
This gives three equations in three endogenous variables, the 
output levels and the rate of interest. To analyse the effects of 
policy note that (2:13) can be rewritten as
(2.13*) r = r(Y, Y*, M+M*)
Thus it can immediately be stated that a monetary expansion by 
either country will raise output in both by pushing down the world 
rate of interest. The effects of fiscal policy are not so clear. 
Consider a domestic fiscal expansion. This unambiguously raises 
domestic output but may lower foreign output if the effects of the 
rise in the rate of interest outweigh the effects of the increase in Y.
If exchange rates are flexible then payments imbalances are 
assumed to be corrected by appreciation or depreciation. This gives 
each country monetary independence thus replacing the single monetary 
equilibrium condition (2:13) with the pair of conditions (2:14)
(2:14) M - M(Y, r)
M* - M*(Y*, r)
This yields a system of four equations in four unknowns, the 
output levels, the rate of interest and the exchange rate. The 
effects of policy are as follows. A fiscal expansion by either
19
country will raise output in both. A monetary expansion by one 
country, e.g. the home country, will increase output there but lower 
it elsewhere. This can be seen from the monetary equilibrium 
condition. With a fixed foreign money stock a decline in the world 
rate of interest due to a domestic monetary expansion must imply 
a decline in foreign output.
The large country results therefore contrast with the SOE 
results in that policy options which the SOE model predicts to be 
ineffective regain some power. In the fixed exchange rate case 
monetary policy is effective because each country supplies a 
significant proportion of the world money stock. Under flexible 
exchange rates fiscal policy regains some power because each 
country is able to engineer significant multiplier effects on the 
world level of output. The somewhat counterintuitive result that 
a domestic monetary expansion lowers output abroad under flexible 
rates arises because monetary policy works by causing a depreciation of 
the exchange rate of the expanding country which reduces demand 
elsewhere.
As in the SOE case, the fixed price model is useful for 
explaining short-run movements in output when prices or inflation 
rates are sticky. However, it has nothing to say about the behaviour 
of prices in response to deviations of output from its natural level. 
Dornbusch (1973) presents a two-country monetary model in which the 
emphasis is on the transmission of inflation via monetary policy.
The assumptions for this model are the same as for the SOE 
monetary approach, i.e. output is fixed and nominal expenditure is 
proportional to the money stock. However, in this case each country 
can have a significant impact on both the price level and thé rate
20
of inflation, even under fixed exchange rates, by virtue of their 
size. The rate of hoarding for each country is defined as the 
difference between nominal income and expenditure or the rate of 
accumulation of foreign assets. In the absence of a fractional 
reserve system this also measures the rate of increase of the money 
stock. It can be written for the home country as
(2:15) M = PŸ - VM
Short-run equilibrium is defined by the condition that the 
home country's rate of hoarding must equal the foreign country's 
rate of dishoarding. Assuming purchasing power parity this can 
be written
(2:16) PŸ - VM - EV*M* - EPŸ*
In a fixed exchange rate regime the price level is assumed 
to adjust to meet this condition. In the long-run the redistribution 
of the world money stock between the two countries eliminates any 
non-zero hoarding rate. The difference in this case from the 
SOE model is that monetary policy does influence prices even when 
PPP holds. Under flexible exchange rates the analysis is unchanged 
from the SOE case with monetary policy determining domestic prices 
and movements in the exchange rate being determined by differences 
in monetary policy.
The above model has sensible long-run features and provides 
useful insights into the transmission of inflation between countries. 
However, again the assumption of fixed output renders it incapable 
of explaining the short-run output dynamics which are the strength of
21
Keynesian type models. The only way of achieving this is to build 
in short-run price stickiness and to explain persistent deviations 
from the equilibrium or natural level of output it is usually 
necessary to build in some form of stickiness of expected price 
changes also. A model of this type has been put forward by Hamada 
and Sakurai (1978). This will be discussed at some length in 
chapter six, but it is worthwhile noting some important features 
at this stage. For the fixed exchange rate case the model is 
quite similar to the Dornbusch (1973) model in that disturbances 
are transmitted via balance of payments disequilibrium. However, 
both output and prices respond so a balance of payments surplus 
leads to inflation and increases in output. An additional channel 
of transmission is analysed in that consumers are assumed to regard 
the products of the two countries as imperfect substitutes implying 
that the terms of trade is a function of relative output levels.
Thus, under flexible exchange rates, a foreign recession has 
inflationary consequences for the domestic economy.
Hamada and Sakurai's model marks a significant extension of 
the theory of international economic interdependence. However, like 
all models which assume sticky prices plus PPP it has difficulty 
explaining the sharp movements in exchange rates during the period 
of floating exchange rates since 1973. Miller (1982) puts forward 
a two country model capable of explaining this feature by concentrating 
on an asset market theory of exchange rates of the kind discussed 
in section (2:2). Basically, either a fiscal expansion or monetary 
contraction can result in an over appreciation of the currency of 
the initiating country. This is due to the increase in the rate of 
interest relative to the other country and the requirement that the
22
exchange rate subsequently depreciates to maintain portfolio 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market. This is similar to the 
overshooting hypothesis discussed previously. The advantage of 
the two country framework is that it emphasises that it is policy 
differences which lead to wild swings in exchange rates. Thus 
coordinated fiscal and monetary policies can be implemented without 
leading to instability in the foreign exchange market.
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(2:4) Policy design in open economies
Much of the early literature concerning the design of policy 
for open economies concentrates on the conflict between internal 
and external balance. By this is meant the difficulty of simultaneously 
achieving a target level of output and balance of payments equilibrium. 
This definition of the problem was first put forward by Meade (1951). 
Using the analysis of Tinbergen (1956) the problem can be seen as 
one of finding at least as many policy instruments as targets.
Policy design is obviously crucially dependent on the model 
accepted by the authorities. Consider the small country monetary 
model with fixed exchange rates. In this case output is assumed 
fixed and prices are tied to world prices by the PPP relationship.
The only variable which the authorities are capable of affecting 
is the balance of payments (by use of monetary policy to control 
nominal expenditure). Therefore no policy dilemma exists and the 
authorities simply set the money stock at whatever level necessary 
to generate the target payments balance. Similarly in the monetary 
model under flexible exchange rates output is fixed and the balance 
of payments is zero leaving the price level to be determined by 
monetary policy.
Unlike the monetary model the flexible output model does generate 
policy dilemmas, at least under fixed exchange rates. Expansionary 
policies increase output at the expense of a worsening trade balance.
The obvious way to deal with this is to allow the exchange rate to 
move to correct the imbalance. This is described by Johnson (1961) 
as the use of expenditure changing policies to control output and 
expenditure shifting policies to control the balance of payments. 
However, under a system of fixed exchange rates such as that
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operating before 1973 it may not be possible to make the frequent 
adjustments necessary to pursue an effective policy. Mundell (1962) 
suggested an alternative choice of instruments if capital flows 
are sensitive to interest rates. In addition, Mundell suggested 
a way of assigning particular instruments to particular targets.
The model can be summarized as follows. Suppose both output and 
the balance of payments depend on a fiscal instrument, say government 
spending and a monetary instrument, the rate of interest. This 
is written:
(2:17) Y = Y(g, r )
(2:18) B = B(g, r)
The Mundell assignment procedure states that fiscal policy 
should be used to control output and the rate of interest used 
to control the balance of payments if
dr dr
<*g dY=0
> <*g
This can alternatively be stated as requiring instruments to 
be associated with the targets on which they have relatively the 
greater effect. If adjustment takes place sequentially with each 
instrument moving to meet its assigned target in turn then this 
leads to stable convergence to the desired pair of values. The 
alternative assignment would lead to instability.
Policy design of this kind must be seen as inefficient since 
by simultaneous choice of instruments the authorities could .
move immediately to the desired levels of the target variables 
rather than by the iterative procedure described above. However, 
in a world of uncertainty where the authorities wish to make their 
intentions clear to the private sector there may be offsetting 
advantages in being able to announce simple reaction functions in 
terms of one variable and one target. This is discussed by Vines, 
Maciejowski and Meade (1983) who refer to the alternative simultaneous 
choice of instruments as cross-linked Keynesianism.
An alternative way of expressing the above discussion can be 
obtained by anticipating the analysis of chapter three to note that 
the optimal decision rule when a controller has a quadratic 
objective function and linear constraint set can be written as
(2:19) u = G(x - xa)
where u is vector of controls, x a vector of states and x& a 
vector of targets. 'Assuming the number of controls to be equal 
to the number of targets the Mundell assignment method simply 
involves restricting the matrix G to be diagonal. Note also that 
the choice of policy by decentralised authorities in cases such as 
this can be modelled as a non-cooperative game c.f. Kydland (1975).
During the Bretton Woods period fixed exchange rates came to 
be seen as a severe constraint on macroeconomic policy making.
From a Keynesian point of view this arose because of the balance of 
payments deficits arising from expansionary policies. Even if these 
could be financed by a capital inflow attracted by high rates of 
interest it seemed undesirable to have foreign claims against the 
economy build up indefinitely. From a monetarist point of view the
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constraint was that a small economy must always accept an exogenously 
determined rate of inflation. Therefore models with very different 
theoretical bases gave the similar normative policy conclusion that 
a move to flexible exchange rates was desirable. It was hoped 
that this would give greater autonomy in policy design by reducing 
the extent to which policy disturbances were transmitted abroad. 
Unfortunately the emergence of transmission mechanisms not incorporated 
in the popular theories of the time have led to the frustration of 
this hope. For example, the simple Mundell-Fleming model predicts 
that a small economy will be insulated from fluctuations in export 
demand by movements in the real exchange rate. However, this result 
does not hold if there is real wage resistance by wage bargainers.
Given that flexible exchange rates do not, except under very 
special assumptions, afford complete insulation against external 
shocks a reasonable strategy might be to design a combination of 
monetary and exchange rate rules to minimise the effects of such 
disturbances. This approach is adopted by Artis and Currie (1981) 
who conclude that the best 'regime' depends on what shocks are 
of most importance for the economy in question. Currie and Levine 
(1983) extend this idea to dynamic models and consider the design 
of simple policy feedback rules which have good operating characteristics 
under a variety of stochastic disturbances.
The extension of policy design methods to include dynamic 
problems has been made necessary by the increasing recognition of 
the importance of dynamics in macroeconomic problems. Work of this 
kind for open economies has been carried out by Driffi11(1982).
This uses a Buiter-Miller type model to consider the optimal design
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of monetary policy to control inflation. Due to the complex nature 
of the problem numerical simulations are used to examine the 
solution. More discussion of this method will follow in later 
chapters.
Most of the existing literature on policy design for open 
economies has concentrated on the SOE case. However, a small 
literature has developed concerning policy design in models of 
interdependent economies. This has made use of game theoretic 
methods to analyse cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour 
c.f. Hamada (1974, 1975 and 1976).
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(2:5) Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to survey the literature 
on the transmission of economic policy between countries. Rather 
than give a blow by blow chronological account of the various 
controversies which have arisen the approach has been to use simple 
stylised models to capture the essential features of particular 
theoretical standpoints. It has also been argued that some sort 
of synthesis has been achieved between the very different Keynesian 
and monetary models in that modern models incorporate long-run 
monetarist features while retaining the short-run Keynesian output 
dynamics.
It must be recognised that a number of important features of 
the macroeconomic models used have not been adequately discussed.
In particular no real justification for the assumption of price 
stickiness has been given. Such a justification would involve 
appeal to such institutional features as long-term contracts and 
would require too much space in a thesis concentrating on open 
economy aspects of macroeconomics. Similarly a thorough discussion 
of alternative expectations formation mechanisms has not been provided.
Future chapters go on to consider policy optimisation problems 
using particular open-economy models. It is hoped that this chapter 
will help show how these models fit into what has become an enormous
literature.

3:1 Introduction
The use of optimal policy design methods was a natural 
consequence of the development of econometric models of the macro­
economy. Since the theoretical framework underlying these models 
was the comparative static 15/LM model the policy dilemmas facing 
the authorities were thought of as trade-offs between the values 
taken by variables at a point in time. Standard optimisation 
methods were therefore sufficiently general to capture the problem 
and there was no need to employ dynamic optimisation techniques. 
Applications of this kind can be seen in Tinbergen (1956). Since 
this time macroeconomic theory and macroeconometric models have 
come to concentrate much more on dynamic adjustment processes 
rather than comparative static equilibria. Thus the policy choices 
facing the authorities are now seen in terms of alternative adjustment 
paths to a steady-state rather than alternative comparative static 
equilibria. This has required more sophisticated optimisation 
techniques such as dynamic programming or Pontryagin methods (cf 
chapter four for discussion of these).
As well as the increasing concentration on dynamics in 
macroeconomic analysis it has also been argued that macroeconomic 
model-builders should recognise that the structures they observe are 
not policy invariant but result from the interaction of optimising 
agents. This point is put forcefully by Lucas (1976). The Lucas 
critique has implications for economic theory as well as econometric 
model-building. In particular when modelling the optimal policy 
choices of, for example, the national monetary authorities account 
needs to be taken of the effects on the behaviour of other agents
sensitive to these choices. For this example it is natural to think 
of the private sector and the monetary authorities of other countries 
as being affected. This kind of interdependence in decision making 
can be handled analytically by the application of game theoretic 
methods. Numerous examples of models in which optimal policy is 
modelled as a game between the government and the private sector can 
be found in the literature, for recent examples c.f. Barro and 
Gordon (1983) and Backus and Driffill (1984(a) and 1984lb)). In 
contrast this thesis concentrates mainly on the interdependency of 
decision making between separate national policy authorities taking 
as given the structure of decision making within the economies.
Future chapters concentrate on dynamic problems using differential 
game methods. However, the technically demanding nature of these 
solutions often obscures the insights which the simpler static or 
'one-shot' games have to offer. Indeed, models in which a static 
games are repeated through time are often capable of capturing 
more sophisticated strategic behaviour by players. This chapter 
therefore makes use of one-shot game methods to consider a number 
of international economic policy issues both in the hope that this 
will make the differential game models considered later more accessible 
and because they are of considerable interest in themselves.
In a series of pioneering papers Hamada (1974, 1975 and 1976) 
applied game theoretic methods to models of interacting economies in 
which monetary policy influenced the balance of payments and output. 
This chapter builds on foundations laid in these papers but gives a 
more rigorous derivation of policy reaction functions and considers 
some important new issues. These include the problem of cheating in 
Stackelberg leader games and the sustainability of cooperative 
equilibria in repeated games. To conform with the static structure 
of the game the economic models considered here are restricted to
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those capable of a comparative static representation. Thus frequent 
use is made of the Mundell (1968) two country model. Despite this 
restrictiveness a number of interesting results are derived.
The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section two discusses 
the solution concepts of interest. Section three applies these to 
the two country Mundell model assuming that the authorities' 
loss functions are quadratic in the state variables. Section four 
considers the alternative specification of parabolic loss functions and 
section five contains conclusions.
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3:2 Solutions for one shot linearquadratic games
The class of games considered in this section are referred 
to as linear-quadratic because they assume minimisation of a 
quadratic loss function subject to a linear constraint set. This 
has proved a very popular specification of the policy optimisation 
problem because it has the property that Theil (1958) terms 
certainty equivalence. This means that if a Gaussian disturbance is 
added to the constraint set then the problem can be solved by 
setting this equal to its expected value of zero. Thus a stochastic 
problem can be treated as if it were deterministic. However, this 
does not imply that the quadratic objective function is always the 
most desirable on theoretical grounds and so section four of this 
chapter considers the parabolic loss function as an alternative.
Before going on to consider multi-player games it is worth 
looking at the single controller o t 'game against nature' case.
Here the controller is assumed to have a loss function of the form
(3:1) \  [x-xa)TQ(x-xa) +
where x is a vector of states on which the controller's preferences 
are defined, xa is a vector of targets or desired values of these 
states, u is a vector of instruments available to the controller and 
Q and R are symmetric, positive definite weighting matrices.
The states are related to the instruments by a set of reduced form 
equations such as (3:2)
(3:2) x - Bu
where B is an nxm matrix where n is the number of states and
m the number of controls.
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Tinbergen defines a system as controllable if all targets can 
be satisfied simultaneously. It is straightforward to show that 
this requires there to be at least as many instruments as targets, 
i.e. m i n .  Unfortunately if the controller attaches costs to the 
instruments themselves then this condition can never be satisfied. 
However, this does not imply the non-existence of an optimal vector 
of controls, merely that the controller must trade off deviations of 
states from their desired values. Thus most systems of interest 
for a macroeconomic policy maker are likely to be uncontrollable 
by the Tinbergen definition but this simply implies that the authorities 
will be conducting the sort of balancing act between competing targets 
which is normally seen as their role.
Setting up the Lagrangean and minimising with respect to the 
controls gives
The certainty equivalence property states that this will also 
be the solution to the stochastic problem in which there is an 
additive disturbance term in the state equation (3:2). If control
(3:3)
where p is the vector of shadow prices on the states. This can
alternatively be expressed in terms of the targets.
(3 :4 ) u = ¡J + R 1BTQB]-1 lR_1BTQx^]
is costless then the R-1 matrix is undefined. However, a solution
can be shown to exist by use of a limiting argument. (3:4) can
be rewritten
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(3:4') u = [R + BTQB] 1 [BTQxaJ
Taking limits as the elements of R tend to zero yields
(3:4") u = [bTQB] 1BTQx 3
It is possible for a system such as this to be controllable 
in the Tinbergen sense if m 5 n. Then there is no unique choice 
of optimal control vector since any subset of at least n controls 
could be used to achieve the targets. However this non-uniqueness problem 
will never arise if control is costly.
The case of multiple controllers changes the state vector to
N
(3:5)
where N is the number of controllers or players. Each player
is assumed to have a loss function of the form
(3:6) i = 1• • • • »N
Consider the two player game. By substituting the state
equation into player one's loss function an indirect loss function
in terms of the controls of the two players can be written
(3:7) [ulT (B1TQ 1B1 + Rt) u
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By symmetry a similar function can be derived for player 
two. If and U2 are scalars then the loss contours can be
drawn as concentric ellipses in u^, u^ space defined around 
a central point where all targets are satisfied simultaneously.
To determine his optimal strategy each player must form some 
expectation about the response of other players to his strategy.
In the Industrial Economics literature this is referred to as the 
conjectural variations assumption. The simplest possible assumption 
is that of zero response or the Nash assumption. Under this assumption 
each player chooses a loss minimising strategy on the basis of 
other players controls being fixed. There is Nash equilibrium when 
all players choose strategies which satisfy the assumptions of 
others. Consider the simplest possible game in which there are 
two players with one instrument each. The optimal choice of strategy 
for each player can be shown diagrammatically by the tangency of 
one of his own loss contours to the assumed fixed strategy line 
of the other player. By varying the strategy of the other player 
the best response strategy locus or Nash reaction function can be 
traced out. Nash equilibrium occurs when each player is simultaneously 
on his Nash reaction function. Such an equilibrium is illustrated 
in figure one.
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and P2 are the central or 'bliss' points for player one 
and two respectively. If their targets are mutually compatible 
then these points coincide. Both Nash reaction functions pass 
through this point and the Nash equilibrium is Pareto Efficient.
If the players' targets are not mutually compatible then the 
Nash equilibrium will not be Pareto Efficient. This is because 
each player imposes an externality on the other when choosing his 
optimal strategy. Under a system of decentralised control this 
leads to a sub-optimal outcome.
In algebraic terms the Nash reaction functions can be derived 
by differentiating the appropriate Lagrangean with respect to the 
control vector and substituting for the states to obtain.
i.e. each player's optimal control vector is a function of the 
control vectors of the other players and his own targets. The Nash 
equilibrium corresponds to the intersection of all Nash reaction 
functions and can be derived as a function of players' preferences 
as defined by their weighting matrices and their targets.
(3:9) IB.R. 1B.TQ.B."1 . 1 1  l xi lJ l
-1 [ZB.R._1B.1Q.x.a]L. i l l l -1
Pareto efficient solutions can be derived by assuming a 
single controller whose loss function is a weighted average of the 
individual players loss functions, i.e.
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(3:10) u. - -wi"1R. 1BiTrWjQ^ (x-Xj3)
This means that in choosing the controls previously allocated 
to individual players the Pareto Efficient controller takes into 
account the preferences of all the players in the game. By varying 
the weights the controller can locate the solution anywhere
along the locus of tangencies of loss contours shown as P^P2 
figure one.
For many years the most popular application of game theory in 
economics was to the oligopoly problem. Different Nash solutions 
were derived depending on whether strategies were defined in terms 
of output (Cournot) or price (Bertrand). The sub-optimality of 
Nash solutions was argued to be the reason for the formation of 
cartels or the emergence of tacit collusion. At the same time 
there was dissatisfaction with the apparent naivity of the Nash 
solution and attempts were made to build models incorporating 
more sophisticated conjectural variations assumptions. One of the 
most popular of these has been the Stackelberg leader model usually 
applied to an industry consisting of a dominant firm and a number 
of smaller firms. The smaller firms treat the dominant firm's 
strategy as parametric but it incorporates their responses into 
its calculations. The key feature of Stackelberg leader models is 
the division of the players into two groups, the leader(s) (dominant 
firm) and the followers (the fringe group).
In terms of the linear quadratic game the Stackelberg leader 
model for the two player game can be derived by first defining 
the follower's reaction function as
AO
(3:12) u2 - G2x2a - G2BlUl Gj - [ l  +
where player two is the follower and is assumed to behave according 
to Nash assumptions. The state equation facing the leader can now 
be redefined as
(3:13) x = (B1-B2G2B1)u 1 + B ^ x ^
The leader's optimal control vector can now be derived by 
minimisation of his loss function subject to the redefined constraint 
set (3:13). This yields
(3:14) u x = -Rx 1[b i1 - (B2G2B1)T] p 1
i.e. the leader's optimal strategy takes into account the follower's
reaction function G2>
For the single instrument case the Stackelberg solution can 
be shown diagrammatically as the tangency of one of player one's 
loss contours to player two's Nash reaction function c.f. figure two. 
Figure Two
Player One's NRF
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The Stackelberg solution requires one player to be dominant 
in some sense though it is often unclear what factors give it this 
dominant role. Because of this the most popular application of 
this solution concept in macroeconomics has been to the analysis 
of optimal government policy with government as leader and the 
private sector as follower. Another application suggested by Kydland 
(1975) is to the case where decisions are taken by separate policy 
making institutions in a fixed sequence. For example, the US 
Congress acquires a leadership role relative to the Federal Reserve 
simply because the sequence in which decisions are taken enables it 
to announce its strategy first.
Stackelberg leader models, although superficially more sophisticated 
than Nash, run into logical problems when the actual sequence of 
decision and implementation is considered. In particular strong 
incentives usually arise for the leader to renege on pre-announced 
strategies. Hamaleinen (1981) describes this as the problem of 
cheating. Consider a game divided into two periods, a pre-play 
period during which the players decide and announce their optimal 
strategies and a period in which they actually implement their 
strategies. If the game has a leader-follower structure then the 
leader carries out the optimisation problem defined by his loss 
function and the constraint set (3:13) and announces the stragegy 
. The follower then chooses an optimal strategy u ^  based on
this. Now in the implementation period the leader's optimal strategy 
. Sis no longer u^ since his constraint set is not determined by the 
reaction function (3:12) but by the fixed control vector Uj . The 
leader always has an incentive to abandon his announced strategy and
cchoose an alternative on his own Nash reaction function, i.e. in
figure three.
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Figure Three
Hamaleinen calls this two-stage cheating. It involves a
certain degree of myopia on the part of the leader since he does
not anticipate and try to exploit the fact that the follower's strategy
is based on his announcements rather than his actual choice. By
making use of this the leader can improve his welfare still further.
Indeed if the reaction functions are linear and the choice of
control can lie anywhere along the real line, then by a suitable
announcement the leader can attain his central or 'bliss' point.
Hamaleinen calls this perfect cheating. The effect of it is to give
the leader control of the follower's strategy as well as his own.
Figure four illustrates such a solution where u^a is the leader's
PCannounced strategy and u^ is the strategy he actually plays.
Figure Four
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For a single one-shot game the Stackelberg solution therefore 
begins to look a little implausible, however, one argument is that 
it describes an essentially dynamic problem within a static context. 
If the game is repeated then the leader has an incentive to stick 
to his announced strategy despite the potential gains from cheating. 
This is because the erosion of his credibility over time due to 
cheating will lead to the collapse of the game to the Nash solution 
and the loss of the leadership benefits in future periods. The 
incentives to establish a reputation for sticking to announcements 
are discussed by Ulph (1984) in the context of a multi-period 
union-employer wage bargaining game.
The Stackelberg solution therefore makes more sense in a 
repeated game model. In this setting it can be viewed as a simple 
allocation of roles to players to achieve a Pareto improvement on 
the Nash outcome. However, the one-shot Stackelberg solution by 
no means guarantees such an improvement as the model considered 
in Section 3:3 demonstrates.
44
In a repeated game setting the Stackelberg solution which 
generates a Pareto improvement is one possible equilibrium for an 
infinitely repeated game. However, apart from games with a very 
special structure it is by no means the only one. Indeed, what has 
become known as the folk theorem of repeated games states that any 
choice of strategies which generates a Pareto improvement on the 
one-shot Nash solution can be sustained as an equilibrium. Since 
the Stackelberg solution is not in general Pareto efficient there 
exist sustainable equilibria which dominate it.
The multiplicity of equilibria in infinitely repeated games 
has naturally lead game theorists to look for plausible restrictions 
on the structure of the game which would reduce this number, 
preferably to some unique equilibrium. Lockwood (1983) introduces 
discounting into the players' welfare functions but while this shrinks 
the set of possible equilibria it is not sufficient to generate a 
unique outcome. Another approach has been to impose a finite time 
horizon on the game. This succeeds in generating a unique equilibrium 
but in a somewhat undesirable manner.
In order to discuss repeated games with a finite time horizon 
it is first necessary to define the idea of a perfect equilibrium. 
Basically this is an equilibrium sustainable by credible threats.
A threat is a conditional strategy of the form "if you choose
action A then 1 will respond with action B . Such a conditional
strategy is credible if in the event of the other player choosing A 
the optimal response action is B. In a repeated game there is said 
to be sub-game perfection if the strategies adopted by the players 
satisfy the perfectness criterion at every stage or taking as given 
the previous history of the game. Perfectness results in the
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collapse of the game to a repetition of the one-shot Nash solution 
in the case of repeated games of full information with a finite 
time horizon. Selten (1975) refers to this result as the 'chain- 
store paradox'. Demonstration of this result is very simple. 
Consider the last period of a finite game. Past history is given 
and there is no future therefore rationality requires the one-shot 
Nash outcome to be the solution. Given this, then, in the last 
but one period there can be no incentive to play anything other than 
the one-shot Nash strategy in the hope that the other player will 
respond by maintaining a tacitly collusive strategy in the next 
period. Solving the game recursively leads to the conclusion that 
there are no credible threats which can sustain an equilibrium other 
than repeated one-shot Nash.
The imposition of a finite time horizon coupled with the 
assumption of full information therefore succeeds in generating a 
single equilibrium. However, this is at the cost of rejecting all 
the Pareto superior outcomes which intuition suggests agents will 
attempt to realise. Recent developments in repeated game theory 
have involved attempts to allow for equilibria other than one-shot 
Nash whilemaintaining the assumption of a finite time horizon. The 
basic way in which this is done is by relaxation of the full 
information assumption c.f. Kreps and Wilson (1982 a and b) and 
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982). Further discussion of 
these developments will be given in relation to the specific economic 
model considered in section 3:3.
To conclude this section it is worth summarising the main 
results. In the one-shot game without cooperation the Nash 
equilibrium is the natural solution since it is the only equilibrium
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which has the property that all players are simultaneously playing 
their best response strategies. Stackelberg leader solutions are 
sustainable in repeated games if they generate a Pareto improvement 
on Nash but there is an infinity of potential solutions. This 
infinity of sustainable equilibria can be reduced to a single 
possible equilibrium in a repeated game with a finite time horizon 
by the chain store paradox argument.
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(3:3) A simple two-country model
This section uses the two-country Mundell model to analyse 
optimal policy in an interdependent world. The exchange rate and 
prices are assumed to be fixed throughout. Alternative specifications 
of the model are used to consider fiscal and monetary policy. For 
the fiscal policy case the interest rate plays no role in the model. 
This can be rationalised by either assuming that aggregate demand 
is interest insensitive and there is no capital mobility or that 
these effects are present but are prevented from having any effect 
because of a passive government monetary policy which stabilises 
interest rates. The two countries are referred to as the home and 
foreign countries with foreign variables being indicated by an 
asterisk. Under the above assumptions aggregate demand in the two 
economies can be written
For simplicity the economies are assumed to be structurally 
similar.
The preferences of the policy authorities are assumed to be 
captured by a quadratic loss function defined in terms of deviations 
of output and the balance of payments from target values and the 
level of government spending.
(3:15) Y = cY + g + mY* - mY
Y* = CY* + g* + mY - mY*
(3:16) L - -  (Y-Ya)2 2
with a similar loss function being defined for the foreign country.
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The determination of output levels and the balance of payments 
can be represented as a reduced form consisting of a set of linear 
simultaneous equations
(3:17) " Y 1 2
Y* - “2 “l
B m (°*2_cli) -m(a2-a1)
s + m &2 * »
m
A
A = s(s + 2m), B = -B* = m(Y*-Y)
The problem is one of minimising (3:16) subject to the constraint 
set (3:17). Making the Nash assumption of zero conjectural variations 
enables the Nash reaction function for the home country to be derived 
by differentiating (3:16) with respect to g subject to (3:17).
This yields
(3:18) ”(a1a2 ” 2m2 (a2~u1)2)
e+a^+Bm2 2
ai ao *  +  1 v
g 2----- 2 10+ot, +8m (a  - a  )
-Bm(a2~a1)
0+a12+Bm2(a2-a1)2
The reaction function is therefore linear in the other country's 
strategy. Government spending increases with the size of the 
output target and decreases with the balance of payments target.
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The slope of the reaction function can be either positive or 
negative according to
Therefore it is more likely to be upward sloping.
(1) The greater the weight put on the balance of payments target.
(2) The more open the economy is, as measured by the marginal 
propensity to import
(3) The larger the marginal propensity to save.
These conditions can be given some intuitive justification. 
Consider a cut in foreign government expenditure, this reduces home 
output and worsens the home balance of payments. If there is a 
large weight on the balance of payments it is more likely that the 
policy authorities in the home country will respond by cutting 
expenditure to defend the balance of payments rather than increasing 
it to defend the output level. Similarly if the marginal propensity 
to save is low and the marginal propensity to import is high this 
implies a small government expenditure multiplier. A rise in 
spending therefore has a small effect on output and a large effect 
on the balance of payments making it likely that the domestic 
economy will respond to a foreign contraction by contracting itself.
The Nash equilibrium can be depicted diagrammatically with 
government expenditure levels on the axes.
8 < “la2 s+m
ms 2
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Figure Five
Under the assumption of symmetry the balance of payments 
equilibrium locus is simply the 45° line. If both countries desire 
a balance of payments surplus then the home country's ideal point 
lies below the 45° line and the foreign country's lies above it.
This implies that the reaction functions intersect below the Pareto 
Efficient locus, i.e. decentralised policy optimisation gives a 
deflationary bias to the world economy. If each country has symmetric 
targets, i.e. same balance of payments surplus and output targets, 
then the Nash equilibrium will correspond to balance of payments 
equilibrium but at a lower than optimal output level (point N in 
the diagram). If the home country has either a larger output or 
smaller payments surplus target than the foreign country then this 
results in a parallel shift upwards of its reaction function as 
shown by the broken line and an equilibrium such as N' with a
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balance of payments deficit.
If both countries desired a balance of payments deficit then the 
home country's ideal point would be above the 45° line and the foreign 
country's below it.* This means that the reaction functions intersect 
above the Pareto Efficient locus therefore giving an over-expansionary 
bias to the world economy.
It can be shown that similar equilibria can be derived with 
monetary policy as the choice variable of the authorities.
Aggregate demand is redefined to be a function of the rate of 
interest.
(3 19) Y = cY - br + g + m(Y*-Y)
Y* = cy* - br* + 3* + m(Y-Y*)
Financial arbitrage ensures that the rate of interest is equal in 
the two countries i.e. r = r*. The balance of payments is defined 
as the change in foreign exchange reserves which is equal to the 
difference between the demand for money and the level of the domestic 
credit base made available by the authorities, i.e.
(3:20) B - M, - C - KY - Xr - Ca
assuming a demand for money function which is linear in output and 
the rate of interest. Since the authorities are assumed not to pursue an 
active fiscal policy setting g =■ g* = 0 enables the reduced form of the 
system to be written
* This may seem an implausible case but Appendix A outlines a simple 
model in which a balance of payments deficit target can be justified 
as the result of the desire of government to maximise the welfare 
of the representative individual in the economy.
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(3:21) ” Y a a
Y* a a
B - 1/2 1/2 -
The loss function is that given in (3:16) with C replacing 
g as the policy instrument. Differentiating with respect to C 
subject to the constraint set (3:21) enables the reaction function 
for the home country to be derived as
(3:22)
B/A-a.2 a
C = ------ ---- C* + ---- 5----
9+a12+B/4 0+Oj +B/4
Ya
8/2
0+ai2+B/4
Ba
This has positive slope if
B > 4 a x2
This condition can be given a similar explanation to that for 
fiscal policy. With B large if the foreign country cuts its credit base th 
the home country is more likely to cut its own credit base to defend 
the Balance of Payments rather than increase it to defend the output 
level. Similarly the smaller is the less the increase in output
relative to the decline in the balance of payments associated with an 
expansion of credit.
The comparative static results also carry through from the 
fiscal policy. If both countries have balance of payments surplus 
targets then the Nash equilibrium has a deflationary bias, if they 
have deficit targets then it has an inflationary bias. If one 
country has a higher output/lower payments surplus target the.n 
it runs a balance of payments deficit. It is only in the case where
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targets are mutually compatible that the Nash equilibrium is Pareto 
Efficient.
So far the discussion has been purely in terms of one-shot games.
If the game is repeated then tacit agreement to limit the inefficiencies 
due to uncoordinated behaviour may emerge. However, the analysis 
of section (3:2) suggested that the scope for this is limited by 
existence of a finite time horizon. In the case considered here 
the policy makers are governments which have to seek periodic re-election. 
Thus cooperation may break down as individual governments adopt 
Nash behaviour in an attempt to maximise their chances of re-election 
via the short-run benefits available from succesful cheating.
Given the difficulties of maintaining a tacit cooperative 
solution the Stackelberg leader solution may well provide a means 
of improving on the Nash outcome by means of a simple allocation of 
roles to the players. It has the advantage that the follower or 
followers play Nash strategies which do not involve any incentive to 
cheat during the course of the game. The leader of course does have 
an incentive to cheat but if he can somehow be restrained from doing 
so then the Stackelberg solution becomes a possibility.
However, there is no guarantee that the Stackelberg solution 
will generate a Pareto improvement. Whether it does or not depends 
crucially on the slope of the reaction functions. Consider the case 
where both countries derive a balance of payments surplus and the 
reaction functions are upward sloping. The Stackelberg solution 
for such a game can be portrayed in a diagram similar to figure 
three. This solution corresponds to a loss contour for the leader 
which is interior to the Nash contour by definition. Since the 
follower's reaction function is upward sloping and there is a
deflationary bias to the Nash equilibrium it follows that the 
follower's welfare must improve as he moves up his reaction function 
in response to the expansionary policy of the leader.
Consider now the case in which the reaction functions are 
downward sloping. The Stackelberg solution for such a case is shown 
in figure six.
Figure Six
Since the leader must choose a point on the follower's reaction funct 
which is interior to his own Nash contour and the reaction function 
slopes downwards through the Nash point it follows that the Stackel­
berg equilibrium must correspond to a loss contour inferior to the 
Nash solution for the follower. Thus the leader-follower game 
structure improves the welfare of the leader but reduces that of the 
follower when the reaction functions are downward sloping.
The results for the Stackelberg leader model for the case where 
countries have balance of payments surplus targets can therefore be
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summarised as follows. Starting from a symmetric Nash position, with 
upward sloping reaction functions the leader pursues a more expansion- 
ary policy which induces the follower to do likewise. The equilibrium 
has higher output for both countries but a payments deficit for the 
leader, there is a Pareto improvement in welfare. If the reaction 
functions are downward sloping the leader pursues a contractionary 
policy relative to Nash. This induces an expansionary policy by the 
follower. The leader runs a balance of payments surplus but both 
output levels fall. Welfare improves for the leader but deteriorates 
for the follower. Therefore even if the leader-follower structure 
was to be imposed on the game there is no reason to believe that it 
would result in a Pareto improvement in welfare.
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3:4 Parabolic loss functions
In section 3:3 the preferences of the policy authorities were 
assumed to be described by a quadratic loss function. Although this 
has been a common assumption in the literature on optimal goverment 
policy it may have certain undesirable features. In particular the 
implication that positive and negative deviations from target values 
are weighted equally is questionable. For instance, in the Mundell 
model considered in section 3:3 it is likely that a given positive 
deviation of the balance of payments from its target value will be 
given less weight than the equivalent negative deviation. Therefore 
this chapter considers an alternative form of the objective function 
which is quadratic in some variables and linear in others. This is 
referred to as a parabolic loss function.
Consider the case where deviations from the target value of 
income enter the loss function quadratically but the balance of 
payments term enters linearly. This implies a loss function of the 
form
(3:23) L = -  (Y-Ya)2 - B(B-B ) + 1  u2 
2 a 2
where u is either government expenditure or domestic credit. In 
the case of fiscal policy the constraint set is assumed to be (3:17). 
The first order condition for the minimisation of (3:23) with respect 
to g and subject to (3:17) yields the home country's reaction 
function
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(3:24) g - ~ala2 g* + Bmía.-a»)
The slope is always negative and less than one in absolute 
value in contrast to the quadratic loss function case in which the 
sign of the slope is ambiguous. There is therefore no possibility 
of improving welfare by allocating the role of leader to one of the 
countries in this case. The intercept is increasing in the output 
target but decreasing in the weight put on the balance of payments.
To consider monetary policy the relevant constraint set is 
(3:21). Taking first order conditions gives the reaction function.
This has similar properties to the fiscal policy reaction 
function in that the slope is always negative. However, if there is 
no cost put on control, i.e. 0 = 0  then the slope has value minus 
one. If this is true for both countries then the possible Nash equilibria 
are not straightforward. This is due to the fact that in this case 
the reaction functions are parallel. Therefore if the targets are 
not compatible there is no interior solution since the reaction 
functions do not intersect. If the targets are compatible the reaction 
functions coincide and there are an infinity of possible equilibria.
It is therefore necessary to assume at least some cost on use of the
2 B
(3:25) C ----- i---
(ax +e)
C* + --- y "—  Y
(a1 +6)
a
2(u 12+9)
controls in this case.
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The general conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is therefore 
that the results are qualitatively similar to the case of quadratic 
loss functions. Reaction functions can be derived which are linear 
in the other country's control and the inefficiency of Nash equilibrium 
depends on the incompatibility of targets. However, the parabolic 
loss functions results in a significant simplification in that it 
removes the ambiguity about the sign of the slope of the reaction 
function.
3:5 Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the standard 
solution concepts of game theory both for games consisting of a 
single play and games consisting of repeated plays through time.
This has led to the conclusion that, despite its apparently naive 
conjectural variations assumption, the Nash equilibrium is the natural 
way to model uncoordinated behaviour in a single play, or one-shot, 
game. For repeated games with perfect information and a finite 
time horizon the Nash solution remains the relevant solution concept 
though infinitely repeated games and games with imperfect information 
make alternative equilibria possible. The Stackelberg leader solution 
was shown to be of some interest as a simple 'rule of thumb' to 
reduce the loss from uncoordinated behaviour.
Having discussed the solution concepts in abstract they were 
then applied to policy decisions in the two country Mundell framework. 
This led to the conclusion that if countries pursued balance of 
payments surplus targets an excessively deflationary outcome would 
result. Improvement on this requires explicit coordination of 
policy or the adoption of an alternative policy regime which reduces 
the extent to which economic fluctuations are transmitted from one 
country to another. It could be argued that it was the failure of 
countries to coordinate policy which led to the break-up of the 
Bretton Woods system and the adoption of floating exchange rates as 
an attempt to find such a regime.
Two alternative specifications of the policy authorities' 
loss functions were considered, the quadratic and parabolic functions. 
These gave broadly similar qualitative results. The overall conclusion 
to be drawn from this chapter is that in cases where the game can
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be represented as a single play or a succession of identical single 
plays then the inefficiency of uncoordinated policy actions derives 
from the incompatibility of targets. This can be contrasted with 
the problem of dynamic inefficiency discussed in future chapters 
which occurs when the state variables which provide the constraint 
set subject to which players choose their optimal strategies have 
an explicit dynamic structure. Dynamic inefficiency implies that 
even when players agree on the steady-state towards which the state 
variables should converge uncoordinated behaviour results in the 
choice of an inefficient convergent path.
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Appendix A
In the main body of the chapter use was made of a government 
loss function which set targets for output and the balance of payments. 
Although this is certainly descriptive of the way in which governments 
have behaved in the past it is open to the criticism that it is 
inconsistent with the maximisation of the utility of the representative 
individual in the economy. The purpose of this appendix is to show 
that this inconsistency can be resolved within a simple Keynesian 
disequilibrium model.
Consider an economy consisting of a number of identical 
individuals. This assumption enables their consumption decisions to 
be determined by a single aggregate utility function.
(Al) U = U(C1,C2)
where is current period consumption and is future consumption.
The second period budget constraint facing the consumption sector 
is
(A2) C2 = Y2 + Y2 + (1+r)(Y1_C1)
Income is assumed to be treated as exogenous. Since the 
consumption function was assumed to be linear it is convenient to 
assume that (Al) is log-linear. This enables the maximisation 
problem of the consumption sector to be written
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(A3) Max lnC1 + 61nC_ + Xr* r* *■ *■
This enables the period one consumption to be derived as
(A4) C1 = Y1 +
1+6 (1+r)(1+6)
If consumers expect income to grow by a fraction t then this 
can be written as a standard Keynesian consumption function relating 
current consumption to current income.
The marginal propensity to consume is increasing in t and 6, 
and decreasing in r. If it is greater than one consumers wish to 
dissave and if it is less than one they wish to save.
Now suppose that investment is determined separately as a 
function of the rate of interest, income and a vector of exogenous 
influences i.e.
C is assumed to measure such factors as the state of business 
confidence which may not vary in any systematic way with current 
economic variables. Since savings and investment are determined 
separately there is no guarantee that at any particular value of 
income the two will be equal. In a closed economy the multiplier
(A5) C 2+r+t Yj
(1+6)(1+t)
(A 6) I - I(r, Y, C)
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would bring ex post savings and investment into equality but in 
an open economy the two can differ if there is a non-zero balance 
of payments.
Thus there are two channels through which the consumption sector 
can save or dissave, i.e. investment and the balance of payments.
In determining its optimal policy the government therefore has to 
take into account the implications for both current output and the 
balance of payments since this affects the consumption possibilities 
in future time periods. Suppose the government has some estimate 
of full capacity output Y^, however at the implied savings-
investment gap is not equal to the implied balance of payments 
e.g. consumers wish to save more than the sum of firm's desired 
investment and the balance of payments surplus. The government will 
therefore be willing to trade-off a negative deviation of output 
from full capacity with an improvement in the balance of payments.
A loss function which targets output and the balance of payments 
is therefore consistent with the maximisation of the utility of the 
consumption sector in the context of a Keynesian disequilibrium
model.
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Chapter Four
(4:1) Introduction
Chapter three introduced some important solution concepts of 
game theory and used them to analyse policy optimisation in a simple 
model of interacting economies. However, the linear-quadratic 
structure considered was applicable only to models in which the 
states could be expressed as a set of linear, simultaneous equations. 
In many macroeconomic models the focus of interest is not on the 
comparative static equilibrium of the model but the dynamic path 
of the model towards (or, if unstable, away from) the equilibrium.
The analysis of policy optimisation in such models requires the 
techniques of differential game theory. The purpose of this chapter 
is to set out these techniques for the general linear quadratic 
differential game. Chapters five and six then make use of these 
techniques to analyse specific economic models.
In chapter three the source of the inefficiency of decentralised 
decision making was shown to be the incompatibility of the targets 
the players put on the state variables. If the states evolve through 
time then there is another potential source of inefficiency in 
that agents may agree on the steady-state to which the system should 
converge but choose an inefficient path towards the steady-state.
The reason for this inefficient choice is failure to coordinate 
their policies. In a differential game it is possible for both 
these sources of inefficiency to be present simultaneously. However, 
since the problem of inconsistent targets was given a good deal of 
attention in chapter three, this chapter assumes that targets are 
consistent in order to focus on the second problem which is referred 
to as the problem of dynamic inefficiency.
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The plan of the chapter is as follows. Section (4:2) considers 
the single controller problem emphasising the role of discounting 
in the loss function, and the effects of forward looking expectations 
variables. The implications of multi-controller games are discussed 
in section (4:3) which uses Nash assumptions to characterise 
uncoordinated behaviour and contrasts this with coordinated or Pareto 
Efficient control. The strategy space on which Nash strategies are 
defined becomes of considerable importance in differential games. 
Section (4:4) discusses a simple Stackelberg leader—follower game 
structure and section (4:5) contains conclusions.
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(4:2) The single controller problem
This section considers the single player or 'game against 
nature' control problem. The Pontryagin minimum principle is used 
to minimise a quadratic loss function subject to a set of linear 
differential equations. The notation follows that of Miller and 
Salmon (1983) and many of the same issues are considered. However, 
some additional features are added to the model such as discounting.
The policy authorities are assumed to have a loss function which 
is an integral over time of a quadratic function of a vector of 
states x and a vector of controls u.
(4:1) (xTQx + uTRu)e + F(x(t^)) dt
x and u are implicitly time-indexed. The constraint set 
consists of a set of linear differential equations
(4:2) x = Ax + Bu
A dot above a variable indicates its derivative with respect to 
time. The matrices A and B are assumed to be time invariant. A, 
the matrix relating the rate of change of the states to their levels 
at a point in time, is referred to as the state-transition matrix. 
The system of equations (4:2) is referred to as the state-space 
representation of the model.
Assuming that the policy authorities wish to minimise the loss 
function (4:1) subject to the constraints (4:2) then the problem can 
be solved by setting up the Hamiltonian function (c.f. Intriligator
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(1971)). The Hamiltonian for this problem can be written.
(4:3)
Twhere p is a vector of costate variables analogous to the 
Lagrange multipliers of the static optimisation problem. The first 
order conditions for the minimisation of (4:3) yield the optimal 
control trajectory for the problem defined by (4:1) and (4:2). 
Differentiating with respect to the controls yields
It can be shown that substituting (4:4) back into (4:3) and 
differentiating with respect to x and p yields a set of differential
(4:4)
e
equations which describes the behaviour of the system under control 
c.f. Dixit (1976). These equations can be written
T
(4:5) x ■^ Ste
where H* is the result of substituting (4:4) into (4:3). By 
, , . —51 .substituting p » p/e the equations can be written in matrix
form as:
x A X
-Q -ATP P
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The effect of discounting is therefore to make the evolution 
of the costates an explicit function of time as well as the level 
of the states. These equations will be referred to as the state-space 
representation of the model under control. To determine the time 
path of the system it is also necessary to place boundary or terminal 
conditions on the states and costates. For many economic problems 
of interest the initial values of the states are predetermined 
but their terminal values are not. Therefore there is no problem 
about specifying the boundary conditions at time 0. At the terminal 
date the choice of optimal controls can be seen as a conventional 
minimisation problem, i.e. the optimal choice implies that the 
costate should equal the marginal change in the instantaneous loss 
function from a change in the state. These conditions can be 
written
(4:7) x(0) = x(0)
3F
ixitT^y
Equations (4:6) and (4:7) are called the canonical equations. 
The case of a single state can be illustrated by means of a phase 
diagram. The state-transition matrix in (4:6) has a saddle-point 
structure, i.e. it has an equal number of positive and negative 
eigenvalues. Thus if the steady-state of the system is given by 
x =* p = 0 then there is a unique stable path to the equilibrium as 
shown in figure one.
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Figure One
If the control problem has a finite time horizon then the system 
will not follow the stable path. However, the more distant the 
horizon the closer the approximation to the stable path. This gives 
rise to the turnpike property in optimal growth models where the 
optimal growth path approximates the balanced growth path for much 
of the planning period.
The discussion of control problems with a finite horizon suggests 
that considerable simplification can be achieved by replacing this 
assumption with that of an infinite horizon. This replaces the 
second transversality condition in (4:7) with the requirement that 
the system must follow the stable path. This in turn implies that 
the solution path must be a function only of the negative eigenvalues 
of (4:6) rather than all of them as in the finite horizon case.
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To show how this simplifies the analysis the vector of states and 
costates needs to be transformed into canonical form. The canonical 
variables z are defined by
(4:8)
_ P
where C is the matrix of column eigenvectors of the state-transition 
matrix. By a well known transformation (c.f. Glaister (1972) p.79) 
the differential equation system (4:6) can be rewritten in terms of 
the canonical variables as
(4:9)
zu
ft 0 n zs s
0 ft zu _ u _
i.e. each of the canonical variables is associated with a single 
eigenvalue, and the eigenvalues have been divided into those less 
than zero (subscripted s) and those greater than zero (subscripted u).
For the infinite horizon case the transversality conditions 
merely require the system to converge on the steady-state. This 
means that only the stable roots should play a role in the adjustment 
process, which requires that the canonical variables corresponding 
to the unstable roots should be set equal to zero. Note that 
(4:8) can be rewritten
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(4.8’) X
"c u C12 zs=
p _C21 C22_ zu_
if z = 0 this implies x » C z and p = C„, z u n s  r 21 s
(4.10) k = cn  e - ^ s tc u '1x
Using the boundary condition that x(0) is fixed, the 
evolution of the states and costates can be derived as
(4.11) x(t) = Cn  e-^gt Clx 1 x(0)
p(t) = C21 e-/^ -sCCll~1x(C))
where e-/'-st is the matrix with e^i on the diagonal (where 
^(i=l»n) are the stable eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix) 
and zeros elsewhere. Thus the time path of the system is open- 
loop in that it depends only on information available in the initial 
period.
Although the trajectory of the system is open-loop the 
optimal control vector can always be written in feedback form.
(4.12) u(t) - -R_1BTC21x(t)
This is still an open-loop control since the trajectory 
of the x vector is determined wholly by initial conditions.
However, it will frequently be of use in future chapters to know 
that there exists a feedback control rule equivalent to the open-loop 
formulation of the problem.
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All the analysis so far has assumed that the initial values 
of the states are fixed. However, for many macroeconomic models, 
particularly those which incorporate rational expectations and 
financial asset prices, this is not a valid assumption. For example, 
in the Dornbusch (1976) model of exchange rate determination the 
exchange rate jumps instantaneously due to anticipations of future 
events. Miller and Salmon suggest a way of dealing with this which 
effectively means that the costate corresponding to the jump variable 
should be regarded as predetermined rather than the variable itself. 
The logic behind this is that since the state is free to move the 
controller will always choose a policy such that its associated 
costate is initially zero. Thus the state-transition matrix should 
be partitioned into jump and non-jump variables as in (4:13)
xl~ A11 _J12 J11 A12 xl~
p 2 =
T T-Q2i -a 22 -a 12 .
x22 P2
p'l -Qu  -A21 -Au  -Q12 Pi
_x2_ a 2i -J22 “J21 A22_ _x2_
-1 TJ - BR B
The subscripts indicate that the matrices have been partitioned 
appropriately. The open-loop dynamics of this system can then be 
derived in the same way as in the case where all the states were 
predetermined (c.f. Miller and Salmon for futher details).
However, there is one important respect in which optimal policy 
differs when the state variables are free to jump. This is that 
the optimal policy derived by the minimum principle cannot be 
derived by the alternative method of dynamic programming. This 
has been termed the problem of time inconsistency c.f. Kydland and
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Prescott (1977). The basic reason for this is that if the state 
variables jump in response to policy announcements then it is 
in the interests of the policy maker to continuously revise announced 
policy so that the states take on the values which make their 
associated costates zero. An important factor here is the reponse 
of the private sector to such behaviour. Further consideration 
of this issue will be given in section (4:4) on Stackelberg leader 
games.
The discussion of the single controller problem has therefore 
lead to the following conclusions. Firstly it has been shown that 
discounting is very easy to model via a simple transformation of 
the costate variables, therefore in the analysis which follows 
discounting is not considered explicitly. Secondly, the infinite 
horizon problem has been shown to offer considerable analytical 
simplification and to be a good approximation to problems with a 
lengthy time horizon, therefore an infinite horizon will be assumed 
in future problems. The final important conclusion is that although 
dynamic programming is an equivalent solution to the minimum principle 
for cases in which the states are predetermined this is not the case 
when the states are free to jump.
(4:3) Nash and Pareto Efficient Solutions
This section uses Nash and Pareto Efficient solution concepts 
to contrast uncoordinated and coordinated policy making. It is 
assumed that there are only two players or controllers but this 
can easily be generalised. Following the discussion of section (4:2) 
it is assumed that the loss functions of the players are undiscounted 
integrals of a quadratic function of the states and the players' own 
controls defined over the interval zero to infinity, i.e.
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(xTQx + u^ Ru ) dt 
o
With a similar function being defined for player two. The 
lack of discounting may cause problems if the loss function becomes 
unbounded, however this will not be the case if the players' 
targets are mutually compatible so that the states and controls 
converge to their desired values (x and u in (4:14) are defined 
in terms of deviations from targets). Even if this were not the 
case then methods exist by which a solution can be determined, 
e.g. the overtaking criterion.
The states are assumed to be determined jointly by the actions 
of the two players according to the set of differential equations 
(4:15)
(4:15) x = Ax + B^u^ + B2 U2
As in the case of static games each player must make some 
strategic assumption about the behaviour of the other. The Nash 
assumption that each player regards the other's strategy as 
independent of his own is again particularly convenient. However, 
in the dynamic case it is not as obvious what constitutes a strategy. 
One possibility is simply to extend the static definition of a 
strategy as a vector of controls to incorporate the time element 
by indexing the vector on the interval zero to infinity. This is 
termed the Open-Loop Nash (OLN) assumption since the strategies 
constitute vectors of controls determined at the beginning of the 
game. An alternative is to specify the strategy space in terms of 
reaction functions. This implies that each player announces that
(4:14) l  
?
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he will respond to the states in a certain way subject to which the 
other player formulates his optimal policy. An equilibrium constitutes 
a pair of mutually compatible reaction functions and is termed the 
Closed-Loop Nash (CLN) solution.
The OLN solution can be derived by assuming that each player 
sets up a Hamiltonian for the problem. The optimal decision rules 
can then be derived in terms of the individual's costates. This 
is given for player one in (4:16).
(4:16) u x = r "1 b * P x
Substituting this into the Hamiltonian and differentiating 
with respect to the states and costates for both players enables 
the state-space representation of the problem under OLN control to 
be derived as:
(4:17) -1 T-BiRi -1 T-B2r2
-Q, -A
-Q, -A
The time path of this system can once again be determined by 
making the canonical transformation.
CMH
u
C13
C22 C23
C32 C33 u
(4.18:)
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Due to the infinite time horizon the transversality conditions
simply require the system to be restricted to the stable manifold,
. 1 2l.e. Zu = Zu = 0. Therefore the costates can be written as functions 
of the states.
Therefore the optimal decision rule for player one can be 
written as feedback form as:
Substituting into (4:20) and rearranging yields an expression for 
the optimal control vector as a reaction function.
This is a static reaction function similar to (3:8) which has 
been simplified by the assumption that the target values of the 
states are zero (or alternatively that (4:21) is expressed in terms 
of deviations from target values). The steady-state can therefore 
be thought of as corresponding to the intersection of two static 
Nash reaction functions. This enables the decomposition of the
(4:19) pt = C2icn  lx and P2 “
Now consider the steady-state of the system as defined by
setting x * 0 in (4:15). This means that the states can be written:
(4:21) x = A 1Blu 1 + A _1B2u 2
inefficiency of Nash equilibrium discussed at the beginning of the
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chapter into the inefficiency of the steady-state and the inefficiency 
of the the dynamic path towards it. Figure two illustrates this.
Figure Two
Thus the OLN solution is derived by assuming that each player 
acts as a single controller facing an exogenous environment one 
feature of which is the control vector of the other player defined 
on the interval zero to infinity. The CLN solution can be derived 
in a similar manner except that, instead of adding an additional 
exogenous element to the state equation, the other playerls control 
adds an additional source of dynamics.
Consider the problem for player one. Player two's feedback 
control rule is treated as exogenous, i.e.
(4:23)
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is treated as a constraint in player one's minimisation problem.
This enables the differential equations in the states to be rewritten:
(4:24) x * (A + B2G2 >x + B^ u^ ^
The problem facing player one is to choose a feedback control 
rule G^ (or alternatively a vector U(t) which can be expressed 
in feedback form) to minimise his losses. The Hamiltonian for this 
problem can be written
(4:25) j (xTQ1x + u^R1ui + U2R12U2) + Pi<(A + B2G2)x + Biui>
where the loss function has been expanded to include the possibility 
that player one cares explicitly about player two's controls. The 
differential equations describing the system under control can 
therefore be derived as:
(4:26) X - I T  - I T  A “B2R2 B2 X
p l - -(q 1+g ^r 12g 2) -(a +b 2g 2)t 0 p l
_p 2_ -(q 2+g }r 21g 1) 0 -(a +b 1g 1)t _p2_
(1)
In the applications of the CLN solution in chapter six it is 
assumed that ” B2 i ” G on t*le grounds that any effect of player
two’s controls on player one's welfare comes through their effect 
on the states rather than directly via their inclusion in the loss 
function.
If the state variables are capable of jumping then there are 
several possible CLN solutions. Firstly if players can implement
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optimal time-inconsistent closed loop strategies then an equilibrium 
could be defined as a pair of these. Alternatively if they were 
restricted to time consistent feedback rules an equilibrium could 
exist in these also. This topic is not pursued at length here since 
the model used in chapter six has ail state variables predetermined.
OLN and CLN models are therefore different ways of modelling 
uncoordinated behaviour. In order to model coordinated behaviour it 
is necessary to introduce another solution concept, i.e. that of Pareto 
Efficient (PE) control. This transforms the two player model into 
a single player model by assuming a single controller whose objective 
function is a weighted average of the individual players' objective 
functions. Thus the weighted loss function can be written:
(4:27)
oo
E w.(x^Qx + Z u .TR..u .) dt 
i-1 1 j-1 J lJ J
Making the simplifying assumption * 0, i^j enables the optimal
control vectors to be derived as
(4:28) u . l
-1 -1 T W. k . B. pi l l
where p is the vector of costates defined in the Hamiltonian. The 
state-space form of the model under PE control can therefore be 
written
(4:29) x
P
A 2 -1 - I T  -E w. B.R. BT . , l l l  l l-l
2
E w.Q. > H
i-1
As in the single controller case of section (4:2) PE control 
is time-consistent providing the states do not jump in reponse to 
announced policy.
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As in the single controller case of section (4:2) PE control 
is time-consistent providing the states do not jump in response to 
announced policy.
(4:4) Stackelberg leader models
In chapter three the Stackelberg leader model was defined as 
a game in which one player correctly assesses the effects of his 
policy choice on the choices of others but these others treat his 
policies as parametric. There is a straightforward generalisation 
of this model for dynamic game models c.f. Simaan and Cruz (1973), 
Kydland (1975), and Miller and Salmon (1983 and 1984). However, 
the definition of the strategy space, i.e. whether it is the open- 
loop time paths of the controls or a feedback control rule on the 
states, is even more important than under Nash assumptions.
Consider first the case where strategies are defined as the 
open-loop time paths of the controls. There are assumed to be two 
players, one leader and one follower. Since the follower acts according 
to Nash assumptions the derivation of its optimal control is exactly 
the same as that for the OLN case in section (4:3), i.e.
(4:30) u2 = -R'1 B2Tp2
and P2 » 3_H-2. - -Q2x - ATp2
3x
The follower's costate vector P2 measures the values of changes 
in the state vector. Since these values are functions of the leader's 
controls the leader can be seen as affecting the follower's controls
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through the channel of his costates c.f. Miller and Salmon (1983). 
the leader's minimisation problem can be set up as
(4:31)
100
(xTQ jX + + U2R12U2^ dt
o
subject to x = Ax + * B2U2
U2 = -R2lB2Tp2
Therefore the Hamiltonian for the leader incorporates costates 
on the follower's costates, i.e.
(4:32) Hx « A ( x \ x  + V V l  + p2lj12p2> + PlT(Ax + V i  " J2P2
*T  T
+ p 2 ("Q2x “ A p2*
where J2 = and J12 = B2R21R12R2
Differentiating with respect to u^ yields the leader's 
optimal control rule
(4:33) u x - - R ^ B jP j
and differentiating with respect to x, p^ and p* enables the system
Thus
as a whole to be written
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The leader's control problem is effectively that of a single 
controller in a model where the state variables are capable of jumps. 
This is because the follower's costates are a function of the entire 
time path of the leader's controls. Therefore even though the states 
are initially predetermined the leader realises that his choice of 
control causes the follower's costates to jump. The leader will 
therefore choose a policy such that the marginal value of a change 
in the follower's costates to hiu. is zero, i.e. p*(0) = 0. Along the
* Iopen-loop time path however P 2 (t) f 0, this implies that the leader 
has a constant temptation to abandon the original policy and implement 
a new one which sets Pjit) = 0, i.e. the open-loop Stackelberg solution 
is time inconsistent.
The similarity between this model and the single controller model 
with jump variables is not coincidental. In practice such models in 
macroeconomics should be treated as Stackelberg leader models. For 
example the policy optimisation problem in models with rational 
expectations should be thought of as a Stackelberg game with government 
as leader and the private sector as follower. To take a particular 
example in the Dornbusch exchange rate model it is the optimising 
behaviour of speculators reacting to announced government policy which 
leads to exchange rate over-shooting. This takes the argument back 
to the basic point made by Lucas (1976) that in designing policy the
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government should recognise that it faces a set of agents minimising 
their own loss functions.
This problem of an agent being tempted to revise his original 
plan even without any unexpected disturbances is familiar in a context 
other than the time inconsistency literature, i.e. the idea of 
cheating in Stackelberg games discussed by Hamaleinen (1981). As the 
above argument shows the problem of time inconsistency arises because 
of the role of government as leader in a Stackelberg game with the 
private sector. The problem of cheating arises when the private 
sector reacts to announced government policy thus giving government 
the opportunity to say one thing and do another.
Given that time or dynamic inconsistency is a feature of these 
models the question arises of how to deal with it. In the context of 
the government/private sector game a number of authors have suggested 
the adoption of fixed, easily monitored policy rules c.f. Kydland 
and Prescott. However, by precluding response to stochastic disturbances 
this merely replaces one source of inefficiency with another. Buiter 
(1981) suggests a solution method which involves dividing the controls 
into a deterministic time inconsistent element and an innovation contingent 
feedback element. However, this does nothing to answer the basic 
time inconsistency criticism.
Calvo (1978) has argued that even if the objective function 
of the government is to maximise the welfare of the representative 
individual in the economy the time inconsistency problem will 
still arise. However, intuition suggests that the problem is 
likely to be much more severe in cases where the government and 
public loss functions are very different. Indeed a great deal of
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the time inconsistency literature including the original Kydland 
and Prescott paper seems to be a restatement of the familiar 
monetarist proposition that fixed policy rules are a way of restraining 
malevolent governments from dysfunctional behaviour.
Although it has most frequently been applied to the government/ 
private sector game the Stackelberg leader model is in principle 
applicable to a much wider range of problems. For example in a multi­
country model one country could assume a dominant role in policy making. 
The time inconsistency problem is likely to be more serious in such 
models both because the loss functions are more likely to conflict 
and because the players are of more even size. This second point 
implies that it is harder for the leader to maintain his position 
by virtue of relative power, therefore the game is much more likely 
to degenerate into a Nash game. Miller and Salmon show that if the 
follower accurately anticipates cheating by the leader then the game 
becomes one of closed—loop Nash. If the follower fails to anticipate 
cheating at all then the solution to the game is the dynamic equivalent 
of the perfect cheating solution discussed in chapter three.
(4:5) Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter has mainly been expository.
Differential game solutions have been set out which describe 
uncoordinated and coordinated policies. The Stackelberg leader 
model has been discussed and related to the time inconsistency debate. 
Chapter five and six now go on to draw material from this chapter to 
analyse policy optimisation in a world of interacting economies.
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Footnote 1
(1) A straightforward analytical solution of the problem defined 
by equations 4:25 and 4:26 is not possible since it requires 
knowledge of the feedback matrices and G2 « However, a numerical
solution for any particular problem is fairly easy. The simulations 
in chapter six use the following method. An initial guess was 
made of the values of G^ and G2 • This was in fact the feedback
form of the OLN solution. Each player’s optimal open-loop policy 
was then calculated given the feedback control matrix of the 
other and expressed in feedback form. This process was continued 
until the assumed matrices and the optimal feedback form matrices 
coincided. In practice it took four to five iterations to ensure 
this convergence.
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Chapter Five
(5:1) Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to make use of the techniques 
of differential games introduced in the previous chapter to analyse 
some problems for policy makers in open economies. Again an important 
distinction is that of inefficiencies due to incompatible targets 
and dynamic inefficiency due to a sub-optimal choice of time path 
towards the steady-state. This chapter will consider a two-country 
model of the world economy in which each country wishes to guide 
the economy towards a steady-state with zero inflation at the natural 
level of output. Thus incompatibility of targets is ruled out by 
assumption though dynamic inefficiency remains a problem.
One problem associated with research of this kind is that the 
complex nature of macroeconomic models of the open economy means that 
application of optimal control methods usually leads to analytically 
intractable solutions which offer little insight. Consider a model 
in which the states are the output levels and rates of inflation of 
the two countries and in which control is exercised via some policy 
instrument such as the rate of monetary growth. The equations of 
motion of the world economy could be expressed as a system of 
differential equations.
(5:1) x - f(x, 6)
where x is the vector of states and 0 is the vector of policy 
instruments. Assuming that (5:1) can be linearised, either by appropriate 
choice of functional forms for the behavioural relationships in the 
model or by taking a linear approximation around the equilibrium,
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and that the policy authorities have quadratic loss functions, enables 
the problem to be analysed within the context of the differential 
game framework discussed in chapter four. However, the state vector 
consists of four variables and each player sets up costates on all 
these. This leads to a system of twelve linear differential equations 
to describe the system under control. In the general case the time 
path of the system will be a function of all twelve eigenvalues of 
the state-transition matrix. By assuming an infinite time horizon 
the solution path can be restricted to the stable manifold meaning 
that it will be a function of the four negative eigenvalues only. 
However, this still leaves a problem of considerable difficulty.
One solution to the above problem has been to carry out numerical 
simulations of control problems. Driffill (1982) and Currie and Levine 
(1985) both contain examples of this for single controller models of 
the open economy. This approach provides useful insights and chapter 
six uses it to analyse dual controller problems in which policies 
are transmitted between countries. However, numerical simulations 
can always be criticised as being specific to the parameter values 
chosen. Sachs (1983) employs an alternative method which involves 
drastically simplifying the underlying economic model in order to 
concentrate on the control aspects of the problem. In his formulation 
the state vector is reduced to a single variable, inflation, and a 
single control, output, which the policy authorities use to steer 
inflation towards its target value of zero. Such an approach is not 
without defects, by over-simplifying the economic model many interesting 
features may disappear from the analysis. However, it does appear 
to be a promising way of obtaining tractable results from control 
problems.
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This chapter makes use of the Sachs approach to model policy 
interaction between countries in an interdependent world economy.
The problem considered is that of bringing inflation down from an 
initially high level while minimising the output costs involved.
A simplified model of interacting economies is used which is consistent 
with a variety of assumptions concerning the underlying economic 
structure. Section (5:2) considers the control problem for a closed 
economy. This is of use for comparison with the open economy models 
considered later. Section (5:3) goes on to consider the policy 
optimisation problem for an open economy treating the rest of the 
world as exogenous. This can be interpreted as the small open 
economy case or as the individual choice of a large country exhibiting 
Nash behaviour. Section (5:4) examines the behaviour of a two- 
country system under Open-Loop Nash and Pareto Efficient control. 
Section (5:5) contains conclusions.
(5:2) Optimal inflation control in a closed economy
The closed economy case can be seen as a benchmark model which 
throws the open economy aspects of the problem into sharp relief. 
The problem facing the country is assumed to be that of bringing
that core inflation adjusts sluggishly in response to persistent 
deviations of output from its natural level. Wage inflation is 
assumed to be determined according to a standard expectations augmented 
Phillips curve.
w and x are the natural logarithms of the wage and output levels 
respectively. tt is core or expected inflation which is assumed to 
adjust according to equation (5:3).
p is the log of the price level which is assumed to be a constant 
mark-up on wage costs enabling (5:2) to be written in terras of 
prices rather than wages. The problem facing the policy authorities 
is to use the control variable, output, to direct the state variable, 
core inflation, towards its target value of zero in such a way as to 
minimise the loss function defined by (5:4).
inflation down from an initially high level subject to the constraint
(5:2) W «  IpX +  TT
(5:3) it = y(p - tt)
CO
(5:4) 12
o
As discussed in the previous chapter, the quadratic loss function 
offers analytical simplicity and has the desirable feature of punishing
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large deviations from the targets severely. The infinite time 
horizon simplifies the transversality conditions by simply requiring 
the system under control to depend only on stable, i.e. negative, 
eigenvalues. This problem can be solved easily by use of the 
Pontryagin minimum principle. The Hamiltonian can be written:
(5:5) H = i  + r x2 + x ( }
2 t 2 t c c
where X is the costate variable. Differentiating with respect to 
output yields the optimal choice of control in terms of the costate.
(5:6)
Substituting back into the Hamiltonian and differentiating 
with respect to the state and costate enables the state-space 
representation of the dynamics of core inflation and its associated 
costate to be written:
(5:7)
2 2,
-Y <P
The above system is saddle-point stable, the state transition 
matrix exhibiting repeated roots with opposite signs.
The transversality conditions require the adjustment path to
depend only on the negative root. Since the state is fixed instantaneously
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by history the costate must jump in to put the system on the stable 
adjustment path. Output is a function of the costate only so the 
phase diagram depicting the system can be drawn in terms of output 
and core inflation.
where w^ is the negative eigenvalue of the state-transition matrix. 
The optimal anti-inflation strategy is therefore to push output below 
its natural level but allow it to rise gradually as inflation falls. 
The initial recession will be deeper
(1) The more effectively output controls inflation, i.e. the larger 
the parameters y and ip.
(2) The lower the weight put on deviations of output from its natural
Figure 1
x
IT
The optimal time path of output can be written:
(5:8) xt r
level in the loss function.
(3) The higher the initial rate of inflation.
The most unsatisfactory aspect of this analysis is the use of 
the output level as the control variable. A more realistic approach 
would be to model the rate of change of output as subject to control. 
However, this would require the examination of a system consisting of 
two predetermined state variables so it is left to chapter six in 
which numerical simulations are employed.
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(5:3) Inflation control in an open economy
The main difference between the problem for the open economy 
and that for the closed economy is that, even if domestic prices 
are a fixed mark-up on wages, the real wage can vary due to changes 
in the terms of trade. It has been frequently argued that the level 
of the real wage is an important influence on the rate of growth of 
nominal wages, c.f. Sargan (1964), Henry, Sawyer and Smith (1976),
Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1982) for empirical tests of this hypothesis. 
Sachs (1981) and Dornbusch (1983) argue that the real wage effect 
or real wage resistance can be an important channel for the transmission 
of macroeconomic disturbances under a system of flexible exchange 
rates. If domestic prices are a fixed mark-up on domestic wages 
then the real wage varies monotonically with the real exchange rate.
A simple way of incorporating real wage stickiness is therefore 
to assume that inflation is negatively related to the terms of trade.
(5:9) p = ipx + tt + S(p* + e - p)
where p* and e are the logs of the foreign price level and the 
nominal exchange rate.
The consumer price level has been implicitly assumed to be an 
exponential function of the price level of domestic goods and the 
domestic price level of foreign produced goods. This formulation can 
be justified by assuming that domestic and foreign produced goods 
are imperfect substitutes and that consumers' utility is Cobb-Douglas 
in them. This enables the rate of change of the consumer price index
to be written:
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(5 :1 0 ) pc = ap + (1 - a ) (p *  + 4)
or rearranging terms
Pc = p + (l-a)(p* + e - p)
i.e. the rate of change of domestic prices plus (1-a) times the 
rate of change of the terms of trade. The determination of the terms 
of trade or the real exchange rate is therefore of central importance 
in the open economy inflation process.
How the real exchange rate is determined depends on whether or 
not capital is internationally mobile and on the intermediate instrument 
used to control output. Consider the case where capital is immobile.
The exchange rate is assumed to equate demand and supply in the 
foreign exchange market which in this case depends only on goods 
market transactions. A  country cutting its output to control inflation 
will expect an improvement in its terms of trade due to the reduced 
amount of its product on world markets. As output increases back 
towards the natural level this gain in the terms of trade is gradually 
eroded. Figure two illustrates this process
Figure Two
P
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D
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The terms of trade are determined by the world demand curve 
for domestic goods. It is assumed that the country has some market 
power implying a downward sloping demand curve. This is not 
unreasonable even if the country is small in terms of aggregate world 
output if its production is sufficiently specialised c.f. Branson (1983) 
for a discussion of this. The supply curve is vertical reflecting the 
assumption that output is the policy variable of government. There 
are two important effects on inflation. Firstly, when a restrictive 
policy is introduced there is an immediate appreciation of the real 
exchange rate, increasing real wages and therefore bringing immediate 
gains in inflation control. However, during the adjustment period 
the real exchange rate depreciates back towards its equilibrium 
value, making it harder to bring down inflation.
If capital is internationally mobile then the transmission 
mechanism is very different. For the case of perfectly mobile 
capital the exchange rate is determined solely by the requirements 
of portfolio equilibrium in asset markets rather than in the goods 
market. The impact of government policy on interest rates is of 
crucial importance in this case. If the demand for real money 
balances is determined by output and the rate of interest then the 
choice of intermediate instrument to control output determines the 
direction of change of the interest rate. Two alternatives are considered. 
(1) Fiscal policy is assumed to mean a move towards budget surplus, 
leaving the monetary growth rate constant initially. This will push 
domestic interest rates below foreign rates requiring an exchange 
rate appreciation to satisfy the uncovered interest parity condition.
Since the real exchange rate must ultimately return to its original 
level this requires an immediate depreciation to make room for the 
subsequent gradual appreciation.
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(2) Monetary policy is assumed to mean a cut in the monetary growth 
rate with an unchanged fiscal stance. This pushes the interest 
rate above the foreign rate requiring a depreciation to maintain 
portfolio equilibrium. In this case there must be an immediate 
appreciation to make room for the subsequent depreciation.
Of course in the long-run there is no such simple division of 
policies into fiscal and monetary policy. The requirements of the 
government budget identity require adjustment of both variables to 
achieve equilibrium. However, this division is of use in distinguishing 
cases in which one instrument is used more intensively than the other 
in the early stages of the planning period. Figure Three illustrates 
possible time paths for the real exchange rate under fiscal and 
monetary policy.
Figure Three
P
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B
To summarise: For the cases of zero capital mobility and 
monetary policy with mobile capital the exchange rate is overvalued
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or alternatively the real wage is too high, along the adjustment 
path. For the case of fiscal policy with mobile capital the exchange 
rate is undervalued and real wages are too low. This is summarised 
in equation (5:11)
(5:11) (p* + e - p) = n (x - x*)
q is positive for the cases of zero capital mobility and monetary 
policy with mobile capital and negative for the case of a fiscal 
contraction with internationally mobile capital.
Along the adjustment path the real exchange rate depreciates 
if overvalued and appreciates if undervalued. This is summarised in 
equation (5:12)
(5:12) (p* + e - p) = <J>(p* + e - p)
or (p* + e - p) = ifn (x - x*)
By substituting (5:11) into (5:9) the rate of change of domestic
prices can be written:
(5:13) p (ill + <5n)x -  6 x *  + ir
If n > 0 then a cut in output has a more powerful instantaneous 
effect on inflation than in the closed economy case. This is because 
the output cut raises real wages as well as reducing the pressure of 
demand in the labour market. If n < 0 then a cut in output has a 
smaller instantaneous effect than in the closed economy case and could
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even have perverse effects if real wage resistance is strong enough 
i.e. it could produce stagflation with the rate of growth of nominal 
wages increasing as workers attempt to make good the fall in real wages 
even though output and employment have fallen. Such a case would be 
unstable so it is ruled out by assumption, i.e. it is assumed that 
(<l> + 6n) > 0.
The rate of change of the consumer price index is a function of 
domestic price inflation and the rate of change of the real exchange 
rate. It can be written:
(5:14) Pc = ('I' + in - (l-a)i(>ri)x - (6n - (1-a)$n)x* + n
The model is now sufficiently developed to examine its behaviour 
under control. Foreign output is treated as exogenous, the loss function 
remains that specified in equation (5:4) but adjustment of core 
inflation now depends on the discrepancy between its current level 
and the rate of change of consumer prices, i.e.
(5:15) it = y(Pc “ tt)
This creates a problem since the exchange rate jumps to put 
the economy on the adjustment path at the time the policy is implemented. 
This of course implies that the consumer price index jumps meaning 
that its rate of change is not defined. The starting value of 
p^ is therefore assumed to be equal to its value just after the 
introduction of the anti-inflation policy. What this implies is 
that agents can distinguish jumps in the price level from smooth
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changes. They incorporate jumps into wage-setting behaviour solely 
through the real wage term.
The constraint set facing the policy authorities can now be 
written:
(5:16) ir = yQtl'+ón - (1-a)$n)x - (6n - (l-a)i(iri)x*}
- b^x - b2x*
This enables the Hamiltonian for the problem to be written:
(5:17) H » — - + —  + X(b.x - b,x*)2 2 1 2
Differentiating with respect to output gives the optimal 
output level as a function of the costate.
(5:18) xt - ~bl \ t  
r
Substituting (5:18) into (5:17) and differentiating with respect 
to the state and costate enables the state—space representation of 
the system under control to be derived as:
(5:19) x*
X 0
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The eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix are again 
repeated with opposite signs.
wl 2 = - y / 'T ' ^  + 5n " (1—a)<i>n)2
and the time path of output can be written
(5:20) xt = ~bl Tr(0)eWlt
where w^ is the negative eignevalue. The interesting question 
here is whether the initial recession chosen by the authorities 
will be deeper or shallower than for the closed economy case. This 
can be inferred by checking the conditions under which rh» 
coefficient b^ is greater or less than ipy. An exactly equivalent 
method is to check whether the stable eigenvalue is larger or 
smaller in absolute magnitude. The possible outcomes are: 1
(1) In the case of immobile capital and that of monetary policy 
with mobile capital n > 0 so the policy authorities will choose a 
deeper initial recession if 5 > (1—oi)<J>. This means that the fall 
in inflation due to the initial increase in the real wage must 
outweigh the fact that the real exchange rate depreciates along the 
adjustment path thus making control of inflation more difficult.
If 5 < (1—a)<♦> then the authorities would choose a shallower 
recession than in the closed economy case. This is plausible if 
workers quickly come to see the higher real wage as the norm and 
resist its erosion by the subsequent deterioration of the terms
of trade.
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(2) In the case of fiscal policy with mobile capital n < 0 so 
the condition for the authorities to choose a deeper recession 
than for the closed economy case is 5 > (l-a)ij) i.e. real wage 
resistance must be sufficiently low that the benefits associated 
with an appreciating exchange rate more than compensate for the 
boost to inflation due to the fall in the real wage.
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(5:4) Inflation control in an interdependent world
As well as considering the behaviour of a single country in 
isolation it is desirable to examine the operation of an inter-dependent 
system. To do this it is assumed that the world is divided into 
two countries, neither of which is small relative to the other.
These are referred to as the domestic and foreign economies. This 
adds an extra dimension to the problem since each country must 
make some assumption about the strategic response of the other 
when formulating its optimal policy.
To characterise uncoordinated behaviour the natural solution 
concept is the Nash solution. This chapter uses the Open-Loop 
Nash (OLN) solution concept to model uncoordinated policy. Chapter 
six goes on to consider the alternative Closed-Loop Nash (CLN) 
solution. Coordinated behaviour is modelled by use of the Pareto 
Efficient (PE) solution concept.
Under OLN control each country treats the other's policy 
vector u(t), defined on the interval 0 to » , as fixed. The 
Hamiltonian is therefore of the form (5:17). By use of the analysis 
in chapter four the state-space representation of the system under 
control can be derived as:
(5:21) 0 0
0 0
-1 0
-bi
r
0
blb2
r r
blb2 ■ A
r
0
0 -1 0 0
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The behaviour of this system through time is determined 
by the eigenvalues of the above state-transition matrix. Examination 
of these is made considerably easier by making use of the restriction 
of structural similarity to employ the Aoki (1981) technique of 
averaging and differencing. This enables the dynamics to be 
decoupled into those associated with averages and those with 
differences of variables. If both countries begin with the same 
rate of inflation then it is interesting to look at the system in 
averages since the symmetry of the problem means that this gives 
the solution for the individual countries. The system in averages 
can be derived as
(5:22) "o —  (b? - ^b.) n r 1 I Z TTa
1--
-- i I—* o
1
>-* 0> 1__
__
The eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix determine the 
rate at which average inflation falls when each country implements 
an anti-inflation policy under OLN assumptions. These can be written
w 1 . 2 + i(/(6n - ( l - a )  (J>n) )
The interesting question here is whether average inflation 
will fall more quickly or more slowly under OLN or PE control.
To derive the equations of motion under PE control it is necessary 
to assume a single controller whose loss function is a weighted 
average of the individual countries' loss functions. Assuming that 
equal weights are put on each countries' losses enables the
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Hamiltonian for the problem to be written
2  *  2
(5:23) H - —  + -— + r—  + X(b^ - b^ x*) + X*(b^x* - b2x)
Differentiating with respect to the output levels enables the 
optimal control rules to be written
(5:24) xt
x*t _2 X r t
Substituting (5:24) into (5:23) and differentiating with 
respect to the state and costate enables the state-space representation 
of the model under coordinated control to be derived as
(5:25)
. *ir
X
X
'o 0 (b2 + bo) 2blb2 ITr
0 0 2blb2 -1 ,, 2 ,2, *
r T  (bl + b2> TT
- 1 0  0 0 X
0 - 1 0  0 X*L L J
The relativi speed of adjustment of the world economy under 
uncoordinated and coordinated control can be compared by taking 
averages of the system (5:25) and comparing the eigenvalues of 
the resulting system with those of (5:22) .
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Taking averages of (5:25) enables the PE system to be 
written as:
(5:26)
Xa
The eigenvalues of this system are:
Since the interaction terms are missing here the average 
of the two economies behaves in the same way as a single, closed 
economy. For inflation to decline faster under uncoordinated control 
it must be the case that the stable eigenvalue associated with (5:22) 
is larger in absolute value than that associated with (5:26). This 
requires 6n - (1—ot)4>n > 0 i.e. b2 > 0.
The reason for the above result is intuitively obvious. If 
b2 > 0 then each country perceives a gain to be made in controlling 
inflation by imposing an externality on the other country, e.g. 
by raising real wages at home and lowering them abroad it buys an 
immediate fall in domestic inflation while imposing inflationary 
costs on the other country. When policy is coordinated via a single 
controller this externality is internalised, since the controller realises 
that it merely shifts inflation from one country to the other. Figure 
four shows the phase paths for both OLN and PE control under the 
assumption that b2 > 0.
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In the cases where restrictive demand policies raise the 
real wage an uncoordinated policy will result in a deeper recession 
than a coordinated policy if the real wage effect is strong enough. 
If the real wage effect is not strong enough then the fact that the 
exchange rate depreciates along the adjustment path leads to slower 
than optimal adjustment under OLN control. If the restrictive 
demand policy produces a fall in the real wage (i.e. fiscal policy 
with mobile capital) then the OLN case will only result in faster 
than optimal adjustment if the real wage effect is relatively weak.
To analyse cases in which the countries begin with different 
rates of inflation it is necessary to look at the dynamics in 
differences. The system in differences under OLN control can be 
derived from (5:21) as
(5:27) 0 ~ t ‘ (bl + blb2) '
1
=* tt
__
__
l
1
oH
____i _ xd_
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which has associated eigenvalues
"‘.2 "
Again the interesting comparison is between OLN and PE control 
or uncoordinated and coordinated policies. The dynamics in differences 
under PE control can be derived from (5:25) as
(5:28) o 4  (b, . b2)J
-1
which has associated eigenvalues
W 1,2 = - (bl + b2>2
The question of interest is whether OLN or PE control will 
result in faster convergence of initially different rates of inflation. 
This will be determined by which mode of control has the largest 
(in absolute magnitude) stable eigenvalue. The condition for PE 
control to give faster convergence is
(bx + b2) > b* + b1b2
This is obviously satisfied if b2 > 0 and even if b2 < 0 
the condition will be satisfied if |bjJ < |b2 |.
At first sight this result may seem a little counter-intuitive. 
Even if coordinated policy results in slower adjustment of average 
inflation than uncoordinated policy, differences in initial rates 
of inflation will be eliminated more quickly. The explanation for
variations in the real exchange rate/real wage to enable the high 
inflation country to disinflate faster than the other. Under 
OLN control the high inflation country's attempts to exploit this 
effect are to some extent offset by the policy of the low inflation 
country.
This feature produces some interesting differences in the way 
the controls move initially. Under OLN control the difference in 
output in the initial time period can be written:
i.e. the high inflation country always deflates more than the low 
inflation country. Under PE control the initial difference is
the effect can be reversed if i/ + 2b2 < 0. This means that the low 
inflation country will cut output by a greater amount. An example 
where this could be plausible is the case of fiscal policy with mobile 
capital. The controller chooses a smaller recession in the high 
inflation country because this means an increase in its real wage and 
therefore results in a faster decline in inflation.
this is that under PE control the controller makes efficient use of
(5:29) xd (0) -b
r
(5:30)
If b2 > 0 then it remains the case that the high inflation 
country has the deeper initial recession. However, if b2 < 0 then
Ill
(5:5) Conclusions
The approach of this chapter has been to set up a fairly simple 
model of interacting economies in order to emphasise the problems of 
policy optimisation. This has proved to have two main advantages. 
Firstly a number of different hypotheses about the underlying 
economic structure can be nested within this general framework, 
e.g. perfect or zero capital mobility. The second main advantage is 
that it enables tractable results to be obtained for policy optimisation 
problems.
These advantages are not without an associated cost. Obtaining 
the analytical results has required a number of strong assumptions.
In particular allowing output to be perfectly flexible even in the 
short-run is somewhat, unsatisfactory. Relaxation of this assumption 
would, however, necessitate numerical simulations. This approach is 
followed in chapter six where it is shown that relaxation of the 
flexible output assumption does not imply qualitative changes in 
the results.
There are several conclusions which can be drawn from the analysis. 
Adjustment to zero inflation from initially high rates has been shown 
to be inefficient. If the real wage can be raised by restrictive 
demand policies and this has a sufficiently large dampening effect 
on inflation then an excessive contraction of the world economy will 
result as each individual country attempts to speed the decline of its 
own inflation rate by shifting the burden of adjustment onto the rest of 
the world. This model therefore provides an explanation for competitive 
appreciation. Another important feature is that, although average 
inflation may fall faster than is optimal, differences in inflation 
will take longer to eliminate.
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Chapter Six
Introduction
In the previous chapter a simple two-country model was used 
to analyse the inefficiency of uncoordinated control. To obtain 
tractable analytical results it was necessary to simplify the economic 
model so as to emphasise the control aspects of the problem. This 
has several associated problems. Firstly it may be the case that 
over-simplification of the model leads to results which are not 
robust when a more sophisticated model is employed. Secondly a 
simplified model inevitably neglects interesting economic phenomena.
For the reasons stated above it is desirable to examine the 
behaviour of a more fully specified macroeconomic model. Since the 
model then becomes too unwieldly to generate analytical results it 
becomes necessary to employ numerical simulation to assess its 
properties. This methodology has been used in several recent papers 
(c.f. Driffill (1983) and Currie and Levine (1984) to examine the 
behaviour of macroeconomic models with quite a high order of dynamics.
Numerical simulations can always be criticised on the ground that 
results derived from them are particular to the parameter values 
chosen. Examination of a grid of parameter values is tedious and 
usually only confirms that the qualitative nature of the model's 
solution is robust to quite wide variations of parameters around 
'plausible' values. The approach taken in this chapter is therefore 
to examine only one set of parameter values for the economic model 
but to examine the effects of changes in the weights in the controllers' 
loss functions. This has the advantage of emphasising the way in 
which the controllers' preferences affect the time path of the system.
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The particular economic model examined in this chapter is the 
Hamada and Sakurai (1978) model of interacting economies. Section 
two discusses the model and examines the influence of policy.
This is followed by numerical simulation of the model under various 
types of uncoordinated and coordinated control. Section four extends 
the model to incorporate real wage resistance and numerical simulations 
of the extended model are presented in section five. Section six 
contains conclusions.
6:2 The Hamada and Sakurai model
Hamada and Sakurai (1978) set out two country models for both 
fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes. Since the transmission 
of monetary disturbances under fixed exchange rates via balance of 
payments disequilibrium is well known this chapter concentrates 
on the flexible exchange rate model. In this case the channel of 
interdependence between countries is via the terms of trade. The 
important issue for policy analysis is the link between monetary 
policy and the terms of trade.
The Hamada and Sakurai model consists of a pair of countries 
linked by trade in goods. All structural equations in the model 
occur in pairs and for expositional simplicity the countries are 
referred to as the home and foreign countries with foreign variables 
being distinguished by an asterisk. Structural similarity is imposed 
on the economies because this enables use of the Aoki (1981) 
technique of taking averages and differences of variables to reduce 
the order of the dynamics.
Wage inflation is determined by the countries' expectations 
augmented Phillips' curves.
(6:1) w » ipx + it
W* = Ipx* * IT*
These are assumed to be linear in the log of output with a unit 
coefficient on core inflation. Unlike H-S these relationsips are 
assumed to be linear. This is necessary for the system to be 
expressed as a set of linear differential equations for the purposes
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of the optimal control exercises which follow in the next section. 
There is assumed to be some sluggishness in the reaction of core 
inflation to observed inflation, i.e.
(6:2) tt = y ( pc- tt)
• • *TT* = y(p -IT*) c
The subscript c indicates that it is the rate of change of 
consumer prices which is important in determining core inflation.^
In an open economy this will not be identical to producer price 
inflation since the consumer price index is a function of the price 
of domestic goods and the domestic price of foreign produced goods.
To analyse the determinants of consumer price inflation it is 
necessary to specify their utility function. The simplest possible 
case is to assume that utility is Cobb—Douglas in consumption of home 
and foreign goods. This implies that the relevant price index is 
also Cobb-Douglas in form. Taking logs and differentiating with 
respect to time yields the intuitively plausible result that consumer 
price inflation is equal to a weighted average of the rate of inflation 
of domestic prices and the domestic price of foreign goods with the 
expenditure shares as weights. The rate of change of consumer prices 
can therefore be written
Pc « op + (l-o)(p* + e)
' *  • • *Pc “ a(P-e) + (l-a)P
(6:3)
To retain the assumption of symmetry it is necessary for the 
expenditure shares on the two products to be equal, i.e. a - 0.5 
and this is assumed from now on.
The production functions are assumed to be Cobb-Douglas in 
a single variable input, labour i.e.
(6:4) X = N S 
*X = N D
It is assumed that the economies are on their demand for labour 
curves therefore implying that the real wage equals the marginal 
product of labour in each case. Imposing this condition, taking logs 
and differentiating with respect to time yields a pair of relationships 
in the rates of growth of nominal wages, producer prices and the logs 
of output.
(6:5) 1 - 8
•*w •* 1-8 '*p -----x
8
The demand for money is assumed to take a particularly simple 
form in that it is proportional to nominal expenditure. However, 
under flexible exchange rates absorption and income are identical so 
this can alternatively be stated as a proportional relationship 
between money demand and the nominal value of domestic production. 
Taking logs and differentiating with respect to time gives
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( 6 :6') 0 ■ m * p + x
* * •*0 - m = p + x
0 and 0 the rates of monetary growth, are assumed to be 
set exogenously by the policy authorities.
Equations (6:1) to (6:6) constitute the structural equations 
of the model. In order to analyse the transmission of monetary policy 
the model can be reduced to a minimal state-space form in terms of 
the logs of output and core inflation levels. Combining equations 
(6:1), (6:5) and (6:6) yields the differential equations in output.
(6:7) x -B<px -  Bir + 60
To derive the dynamics of core inflation note that the rate of 
change of the real exchange rate can be written:
(c.f. Appendix for derivation of this result). This implies that the 
rate of change of the nominal exchange rate can be written
x *
(6:8) • •*P “ P “ e - •*x - x
(6:9) e = (p + x) - (p* + x*)
*or e = 0 - 0
119
This enables the rates of change of consumer prices 
(equation (6:3)) to be rewritten
( 6 : 10) Pc - 0 - -5x •5x*
’* * ’ •*P„ “ 0 ~ "5x - •5x
The rates of change of core inflation can therefore be derived
by substituting (6:10) into (6:2) and using (6:7) to express 
' '*x and x in terms of levels rather than rates of change. The 
minimal state—space representation of the model can then be written 
in matrix form as
(6:11) X -Bill 0 -B 0 X
X* 0 -6 ip 0 -6 *X
TT •5yB ip •5y8 il> -Y(1--5B) •5y8 TT
•*TT •5y Bil> *5y Bill •5y 8 -Y(1--5B) 77*
8
0
0
8
e
e*
y(l--5B) -'SyS
-•5y6 y (1--5B)
As in the previous chapter considerable simplification in the 
expression of the model can be achieved by taking averages and differences 
of the state variables. This decouples the system into two separate 
2 x 2  systems in averages and differences yielding obvious advantages
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for examination of cyclical and stability conditions. The system 
in averages can be derived as
X£1 -B Xa B
- 4
tr
a y Bil> - y (1 -B ) IT y (1 -8 )
The eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix in (6:12) 
can be derived as
_ ~(BV + y(l-B) ± /(&<)> + y (1-8))2 - 4(YB2<i»+Bii>(l-8))
W1 > 2 ----------------------------------------- --- ------
2
Since, a priori, all coefficients are expected to be positive 
it can immediately be stated that the system is stable providing 
these expectations are not violated. The possibility of complex 
roots and therefore a cyclical approach to equilibrium exists if
4 ( y B2i|;+BiK 1 - B )  > (BV+y (1 -6 )  ) 2
Since (6:12) is a (2x2) system it is possible to represent 
the dynamics of adjustment by means of a phase diagram. Figure one 
shows the equilibrium loci and the arrows of motion out of equilibrium 
for the case of zero money growth in both countries.
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Figure One
The arrows of motion indicate that, as required, the system 
is globally stable.
The nature of the choice facing the policy authorities can 
be analysed more clearly by looking at the equations of (6:12) 
separately. These can be rewritten
(6; 12') x - -Bipx -  B (ir - 0 )a a a a
(6:12") tt - yB*x - y(l-6) (it - 6 ) a “ a a
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In both cases the crucial variable determining the rate of 
change of the state variable is the gap between core inflation and 
the rate of monetary growth. Since core inflation is fixed 
instantaneously this can be viewed as the policy instrument of the 
authorities. Starting from an initial position where the world 
economy is at its natural level of output but there is positive 
inflation, the choice is whether to cut money growth quickly and 
achieve a quick fall in inflation at the expense of a sharp movement 
into recession or to adopt a more gradualist approach. The time 
paths which result from these strategies are illustrated in figure two.
Path A shows a 'cold turkey' strategy. The money growth rate 
is cut quickly and there is a short, but deep, recession. Path B 
shows a gradualist strategy the authorities keep the gap between
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core inflation and monetary growth small and the adjustment period 
is prolonged. However, along path B output doesn't fall too far 
below its natural level. The chosen path will tend to resemble 
B if the authorities put a large weight on output in their objective 
function. Another factor favouring a gradualist choice is an 
objective function which penalises large deviations from target 
level severely, such as the quadratic loss functions discussed in 
chapter four.
The above discussion of policy assumes a single controller 
with responsibility for managing the world economy as if it were 
a single, closed economy. And the discussion in chapter five showed, 
if there are several controllers and significant linkages between 
economies, the realised outcome is unlikely to approximate this.
The important question then becomes the extent to which actual 
policy differs from that which would be chosen by a hypothetical 
single controller. Section two of this chapter examines this 
issue by means of numerical simulation of the model under various 
kinds of decentralised control.
Examination of the system in averages gives interesting results 
for the case in which both countries have the same initial rate of 
inflation. However, if the countries have different inflation rates 
then the relevant system becomes that in differences. This can be 
derived from (6:11) as:
(6:13)
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The eigenvalues of this state-transition matrix are derived 
by inspection as -$ip and - y  implying stable adjustment to the 
steady-state. Again some additional insight can be gained by writing 
out the equations of (6:13) separately.
(6.13’) xd = -6^xd - 6((tt-6) - (tt*-0*))
(6.13") nd = -Y ((rr-0) - (tt*-0*) )
The rate of change of the variables in differences can be seen 
to depend on the relative severity of the deflationary strategies 
adopted. If the home country opens up a bigger gap between cora 
inflation and the rate of monetary growth than the foreign country 
then it achieves a faster decline in inflation but at the cost of 
a sharper movement into recession.
Consider a situation in which both countries are initially 
at their natural levels of output but the home country has a zero 
rate of inflation while the foreign country has a positive rate.
A cut in monetary growth by the foreign country will move it into 
recession and start a decline in inflation. However, the reduced 
amount of foreign output on the market moves the terms of trade 
against the home economy and produces inflation. This opens up a 
positive gap between core inflation and monetary growth and leads 
to recession in the home economy. This transmission mechanism is 
described by H-S as "a lower foreign rate of monetary expansion leads 
to a transitory period of stagflation at home".
1
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Under decentralised control the home country will offset the 
deflationary strategy of the foreign country to some extent. It 
could cut its money growth rate so as to prevent some of adverse 
movement in the terras of trade which lead to an acceleration of 
inflation. Alternatively it could increase monetary growth in order 
to prevent a movement into recession. The strategy it adopts depends 
on the weights in the loss function. However, it is unlikely that 
the strategies adopted under decentralised control would be those 
chosen by a Pareto Efficient controller. Therefore the inefficiencies 
of uncoordinated control do not just result in inefficient movements 
of aggregate variables but also imply inefficient reactions to 
asymmetries in initial conditions. Without looking at specific 
numerical examples it is difficult to say in which direction the 
inefficiencies will occur, i.e. whether the resulting time path will 
be over contractionary or insufficiently restrictive.
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6:3 Control simulations of the model
The purpose of this section is to examine the behaviour of the 
model under control and in particular the implications of decentralised 
control. Chapter four set out a number of non-cooperative differential 
game solution concepts. This chapter uses the Open-Loop Nash (OLN) 
and Closed-Loop Nash (CLN) regimes to describe decentralised control. 
These solutions are contrasted with the Pareto Efficient (PE) solution 
which is obtained by assuming a single controller whose loss function 
is a weighted average of the individual country's loss functions.
Since the countries are treated symmetrically throughout these 
weights will be assumed equal.
The loss functions of the two countries are assumed to be 
quadratic in the log of output, core inflation and the rate of 
monetary growth. They can be written
(6:14)
r°° 2 2 2 (qxx + q^ 7r + r0 ) dt
o
i ” (q x x * 2 + q ^ * 2 + r e * 2 ) d t
Despite the fact that the loss functions are undiscounted 
integrals they are defined since all variables approach a steady-state 
value of zero (for further discussion of this and the incorporation of 
a discount factor into the problem see chapter four). The choice of 
variables in the loss function deserves some comment. Output is an 
obvious variable to include but the choice of core inflation 
is not so clear. The reason for the inclusion of core inflation
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rather than any of the other possible indices (i.e. wage inflation, 
producer price inflation, consumer price inflation) is to keep the 
mathematical structure of the problem simple. This is because core 
inflation is not subject to discrete jumps at the beginning of the 
control period in the way that producer and consumer price inflation 
are, and does not complicate the calculation of the state transition 
matrix under control by requiring examination of cross-product 
terms in x and n in the way that wage inflation does. The 
final term 9 is included to capture the costs of implementing 
the policy.
To determine the weights in the objective function the following 
procedure was implemented. First a single reference comparison was 
decided on, e.g. a 5% deviation of output from its natural 
contributes as much to welfare loss as 10% inflation. This comparison 
was then used to find the implied relative weight on the output 
and inflation variables. Two alternatives were tried. Firstly 
a 5% shortfall in output was valued as highly as 10% inflation 
this resulted in a weight of 3.8 on the output variable when that 
on core inflation is 1.0. Secondly as 5% shortfall in output was 
valued as highly as 20% inflation this resulted in relative weights 
of 15.2 and 1.0. The weight on monetary growth was assumed to 
be unity throughout.
Open Loop Nash simulations
In chapter four the Open-Loop Nash solution concept was defined 
by the condition that agents announce control vectors over time 
which correspond to the minimum loss attainable given the control 
vectors of the other agents. Thus the strategy space is the Value
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of monetary growth defined over the interval zero to infinity.
The general format for the state-transition matrix under OLN 
control and the time path of the system can be found in chapter four.
OLN Simulation 1
The numerical values assumed for the parameters were as follows
6 - !(, « Y - 0.5 qx = 3.8 = 1.0 r - 1.0
Since there are four predetermined state variables the state- 
transition matrix should have four negative or stable eigenvalues. 
These were derived as
-1.23143
-0.961277
-0.187475
-0.140512
None of the stable roots are complex implying that the approach 
to the steady-state is monotonic. The next stage of the numerical 
analysis was to examine the time path of the system. A starting 
value for the system was assumed in which each economy was at the 
natural level of output but inflation was 105!. Table one summarises 
the time path. Since the two countries are identical» the results 
for one country only are presented. Time periods are referred to as 
years for convenience.
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Table one
OLN Control qx = 3.8 qn = 1.0 r — 1.0
T X TT e w P w/p Lt/L0
0 100.00 10.00 -4.00 10.00 3.00 .5000 100.00
1 95.92 7.29 1.00 5.21 3.11 .5212 85.59
2 95.08 5.66 2.92 3.14 3.14 .5258 67.21
3 95.32 4.54 3.14 2.15 2.65 .5245 49.30
4 95.88 3.72 2.88 1.61 2.25 .5214 34.93
5 96.49 3.06 2.49 1.27 1.88 .5182 24.35
6 97.01 2.53 2.11 1.03 1.55 .5152 16.85
7 97.53 2.09 1.76 0.84 1.31 .5126 11.61
8 97.95 1.73 1.47 0.69 1.09 .5105 7.99
9 98.29 1.44 1.22 0.57 0.90 .5087 5.50
10 98.58 1.19 1.01 0.48 0.74 .5072 3.78
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Because the quadratic loss function punishes large deviations 
from targets heavily the optimal strategy is to cut monetary growth 
to negative rates during the first year of the planning period. As 
inflation falls and the economy moves into recession this restrictive 
stance is relaxed. Price inflation falls rapidly due to the cut 
in monetary growth and the movement into recession. Wage inflation 
and core inflation respond sluggishly to price inflation. Because 
both countries implement similar strategies there is no difference 
between consumer and producer price inflation and both the real and 
nominal exchange rates are constant. The real wage is higher than 
its natural level along the adjustment path due to the decline in 
output.
OLN Simulation 2
In order to assess the effects on the time path of changing the 
relative weights on output and inflation an alternative version was 
run with parameter values
8 - i/, - Y . o.5 qx - 15.2 q^ = 1.0 r = 1.0
The stable eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix in this 
case are:
-2.117601
-1.923262
-0.092973
-0.082404
Again there are no complex roots so convergence to the steady- 
A priori expectations suggest that a largerstate is monotonie.
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Table 2
OLN Control q -15.2 x
T X IT 6
0 100.00 10.00 -4.30
1 97.05 8.00 4.98
2 96.89 7.13 5.83
3 97.10 6.48 5.51
4 97.34 5.90 5.05
5 97.57 5.37 4.60
6 97.79 4.90 4.19
7 97.98 4.46 3.82
8 98.16 4.07 3.48
9 98.32 3.70 3.17
10 98.47 3.38 2.89
" 1.0 r = 1.0
w P w/p V Lo
10.00 2.84 .5000 100.00
6.51 5.73 .5152 90.84
5.55 5.69 .5161 76.97
5.00 5.26 .5149 64.12
4.55 4.80 .5136 53.27
4.15 4.37 .5124 44.24
3.78 3.98 .5113 36.73
3.44 3.63 .5103 30.50
3.14 3.31 .5094 25.32
2.86 3.01 .5085 21.03
2.60 2.75 .5078 17.46
Figure 3a
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weight on output will lead to slower adjustment with output remaining
closer to its natural level. This is confirmed by examination of the
time path of the system given in table two. The qualitative nature
of the adjustment process does not change but the actual trajectory
does. Figure three illustrates the time paths of output, core inflation
and monetary growth and compares them with the case of q 3.8.x
CLN Simulations
The OLN solution corresponds to an equilibrium in strategies 
defined on the control vectors. An alternative is to define the 
strategy space in terms of reaction functions. This was discussed 
in chapter four and an algorithm was suggested for the derivation of 
the closed-loop solution. This algorithm was used to calculate the 
CLN solution for the same parameter values used in the OLN problem.
The first set of parameters is
6 = * - y - 0.5 qx = 3.8 q^ = 1.0 r = 1.0
The state-transition matrix for this problem can be derived 
by numerical iteration. This yields four stable eigenvalues:
-1.231206
-0.960429
-0.187925
-0.140686
136
Table Three
CLN Control qx - 3.8 - 1.0 r = 1.0
T X ir e w P w/p V Lo
0 100.00 10.00 -4.44 10.00 2.78 .5000 100.00
1 95.91 7.50 1.24 5.20 3.22 .5213 85.30
2 95.08 5.66 2.91 3.13 3.02 .5259 66.89
3 95.32 4.54 3.14 2.14 2.65 .5245 49.02
A 95.88 3.71 2.87 1.60 2.24 .5215 34.71
5 96.49 3.05 2.49 1.26 1.88 .5182 24.17
6 97.05 2.52 2.10 1.02 1.56 .5152 16.71
7 97.53 2.08 1.76 0.84 1.30 .5126 11.51
8 97.95 1.73 1.46 0.69 1.08 .5105 7.91
9 98.29 1.43 1.21 0.57 0.89 .5087 5.44
10 98.58 1.18 1.01 0.47 0.74 .5072 3.73
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These show little change from the OLN case suggesting that the 
CLN time path will also be similar. This is confirmed by examination 
of the time path in Table three.
For closed—loop solutions it becomes natural to express 
the model in feedback form in open-loop cases. The similarity 
between the two is another measure of the similarity of the OLN 
and CLN solutions. This can be seen in Table four.
Table Four
Hypothetical OLN 
feedback form
CLN feedback 
control coefficients
Own output -0.9681 -0.9664
Foreign output -0.1085 -0.1083
Own inflation -0.4129 -0.4148
Foreign inflation -0.0287 -0.0291
The results are similar for the alternative set of parameter 
values, i.e.
6 * 4» = Y qx = 15.2 - 1.0 qr = 1.0
This yields negative eigenvalues
-2.116896
-1.92218
-0.09311
-.082493
which are again very similar to the OLN values. Table five shows 
the time paths of the variables of interest which differ little 
from those under OLN control. Table six gives the feedback control 
coefficients.
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Table Five
CLN Control q =15.2 x
T X TT e
0 100.00 10.00 -4.31
1 97.05 8.00 4.98
2 96.88 7.13 5.83
3 97.09 6.47 5.50
4 97.34 5.89 5.04
5 97.57 5.37 4.60
6 97.79 4.89 4.19
7 97.98 4.46 3.82
8 98.16 4.06 3.48
9 98.32 3.69 3.17
10 98.47 3.37 2.89
%  “ 1 .0 r = 1.0
w P w/p V Lo
10.00 2.84 .5000 100.00
6.51 5.73 .5152 90.75
5.55 5.69 .5161 76.87
5.00 5.25 .5149 64.02
4.55 4.79 .5136 53.17
4.14 4.37 .5124 44.14
3.77 3.98 .5113 36.64
3.44 3.63 .5103 30.41
3.13 3.31 .5094 25.25
2.85 3.01 .5085 20.96
2.60 2.74 .5078 17.40
139
Table Six
Hypothetical OLN CLN feedback
feedback form control coefficients
Own output -2.6606 
Foreign output -0.1566 
Own inflation -0.4132 
Foreign inflation -0.0172
-2.6582
-0.1568
-0.4144
-0.0174
The conclusion to be drawn from these simulations is that 
the choice of solution concept to describe non-cooperative behaviour 
does not really make much difference. OLN and CLN solutions produce 
almost identical time paths.
Pareto Efficient Simulations
In chapter four a Pareto Efficient solution was derived 
by assuming a single controller with a loss function consisting of 
a weighted average of the individual countries’ loss functions. In 
this chapter this solution is used to characterise cooperative 
behaviour among countries. The interesting question is whether 
the PE solution can improve welfare relative to the non-cooperative 
solutions, OLN and CLN.
Taking the first set of parameters, i.e. that with q^ = 3.8 
yields a state-transition matrix with stable roots.
-1.221090
-0.990269
-0.144746
-0.178514
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Table Seven
PE Control qx =■ 3.8
or-HIIcr r = 1 . 0
T X IT e w p w/p V Lo
0 100.00 1 0 .00  ■-4.14 10.00 2.93 .5000 100.00
1 96.03 7.36 1.53 5.34 3.43 .5207 85.48
2 95.22 5.79 3.13 3.34 3.24 .5251 67.41
3 95.45 4.70 3.31 2.37 2.84 .5238 49.91
4 95.98 3.88 3.02 1.83 2.43 .5209 35.29
5 96.55 3.23 2.63 1.47 2.05 .5178 25.36
6 97.08 2.69 2.23 1.21 1.72 .5150 17.84
7 97.54 2.25 1.88 1.00 1.44 .5126 12.51
8 97.94 1.88 1.58 0.84 1.21 .5105 8.76
9 98.27 1.57 1.32 0.70 1.01 .5088 6.13
10 98.55 1.31 1.11 0.59 0.85 .5073 4.29
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The time path of the system is given in table seven. For 
the first eight periods of the policy the PE output level is above 
that for OLN control but the difference never exceeds 0.13 percentage 
points. Similarly for core inflation the maximum difference between 
the OLN and PE values is 0.17 percentage points. The similarity 
between the paths can be seen in Figure four.
The similarity of the uncoordinated and coordinated time 
paths is also the case for the model with a larger weight on 
inflation with = 15.2 the stable eigenvalues of the state- 
transition matrix are:
-2.086942
-1.963261
-0.084706
-0.090042
These are similar to the OLN and CLN values suggesting that the time 
path will also be similar. This is confirmed by examination of 
table eight and figure five.
In both cases therefore the OLN and PE time paths are 
remarkably similar. This suggests that policy coordination will 
lead to relatively minor welfare gains, at least within the context 
of this model. Table nine gives the total welfare loss over the 
interval zero to infinity under the various types of control, 
taking OLN - 100.00.
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Table Eight
PE Control = 15.2 q^ = 1.0 r - 1.0
T x
0 100.00
1 97.12
2 96.97
3 97.17
4 97.40
5 97.62
6 97.82
7 98.01
8 98.18
9 98.33
10 98.47
IT 0
10.00 -4.14
8.05 5.13
7.20 5.94
6.56 5.60
5.99 5.15
5.48 4.71
5.01 4.30
4.57 3.93
4.18 3.59
3.82 3.28
3.49 3.00
w P
10.00 2.93
6.51 5.86
5.55 5.80
5.00 5.36
4.55 4.91
4.15 4.49
3.78 4.10
3.44 3.75
3.14 3.43
2.86 3.13
2.60 2.86
w/p V Lo
.5000 100.00
.5148 90.86
.5156 77.28
.5146 64.74
.5133 54.09
.5122 45.18
.5111 37.74
.5101 31.52
.5093 26.32
.5085 21.99
.5077 18.36
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Table Nine
Welfare Loss from o rt 0 8
q « 3.8
X q - 15.2X
OLN 100.00 100.00
CLN 98.69 98.18
PE 98.55 98.11
Table Nine confirms that there is relatively little improvement 
in welfare to be made by coordination of policy. A more promising 
way of reducing welfare losses would be to concentrate on improving 
the efficiency of policy for example, by speeding up the rate of 
adjustment of core inflation.
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6:4 Real Wage Resistance
The H-S model discussed in section 6:2 gives no role to 
real wage resistance in the wage adjustment process. Since this 
was found to be of considerable importance in determining the 
solution path of the simple dynamic problem presented in chapter 
five the H-S model is now extended to incorporate this feature. 
This generates a model with considerably more complex dynamics 
than that of chapter five and therefore requires numerical methods 
to assess its control properties. Simulations for the extended 
model are presented in section 6:5.
As in chapter five the Phillips curve is assumed to be of
the form
(6:15) w = t/tx + tr + 6 (w -p ^ -R w ) 
w * = i|)x* + n *  + 5 ( w * - p c * -R w *)
i.e. wage inflation is sensitive to output, core inflation and the 
deviation of the log of the real wage as perceived by consumers 
from some target value, Rw. The log of the real wage can be written
(6:16) w-pc = (w-p) - (1-a)(p*+e-p)
w*-pc » (w*-p*) - a(p-p*-e)
(6:16) decomposes the real consumer wage into two components. The 
first is the real product wage or the real wage as perceived by 
firms. The second is the terms of trade weighted by the expenditure
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share on foreign products. Since the home and foreign economies 
are symmetric the development of the model is continued in terms of 
the home economy only, also since it is desirable to retain the 
assumption of structural symmetry a is set equal to 0.5.
The log of the real product wage can be derived from 
the production function as
the target real wage is that which is consistent with the natural 
level of output, i.e. Rw = InS. This enables the wage adjustment 
equation to be rewritten
An increase in output increases wage inflation for three 
reasons, firstly the straightforward Phillips curve effect via the 
parameter <Ji, secondly because it lowers the real product wage 
as the marginal productivity of labour declines and thirdly because it 
causes an adverse movement in the terms of trade. Foreign output 
has a negative influence on domestic wage inflation because an 
increase in it will move the terms of trade in favour of the home 
country and thereby increase the real consumer wage. Note that
(6:17) w-p = InB - xP
The terms of trade can also be expressed in terms of output as
(6:18) p * + e - p  = x - x *
Without significant loss of generality it is assumed that
(6:19) w
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(6:19) differs from the wage adjustment equation in chapter five 
because it allows the real product wage to vary with output 
where previously it had been fixed due to the assumption of a 
constant mark-up of prices on wages.
The derivation of the minimal state-space representation of 
the model follows that in section 6:2. Combining (6:5), (6:6) and 
(6:19) leads to the differential equations in output.
(6:20) x = 89 - (Bi/i + 6(1-8) + .568)x + .566x* - 8"
x* - 86* - (8i(i + 6(1-8) + .568)x* + .568x - Sir*
The differential equations in core inflation can be written
(6:21) -r = y(9 - .5x - .5x* - it)
• * . it k *ir = y(9 - .5x - .5x - it*)
Combining (6:20) and (6:21) enables the state-space 
representation of the model to be written in matrix form.
X - ( 6 ^ + 6 ( 1 - . 5 8 ) ) .5 6 8 - B 0
X * . 5 6 8 - ( B i )<+6 ( 1 - .  5 6 )  ) 0 - 6
IT . 5 y ( B * + 6 ( 1 - 8 ) . 5 y  ( 61(1+6 ( 1 - 8 )  ) - Y ( 1 - . 5 B ) . 5 y 8
•*
TT . 5 y ( B < M - 6 ( 1 - 8 ) ) . 5 y ( B * + 6 ( 1 - S ) ) . 5 y B - Y ( 1 - . 5 B )
■f B 0 r 9 "
0 8
Y(1-.5B) -.5y6
-.5yB y (1-.56)
This can be reduced to a manageable order of dynamics by 
the process of taking averages and differences. The system in 
averages can be derived as
(6:23) Xa -(8^+6(1-8)) -6 Xa 8= +
TT
a y(6i(-+6(l-8)) -y(l-B) TTa y ( 1 - 8 )
This system differs from that derived for the model without 
real wage resistance (6:12) in that output has a more powerful 
effect on both its own rate of change and that of core inflation. 
The eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix can be derived as:
w_  «  - ( a + y ( l - 6 )  ±1/  (a + y ( l -B ) ) 2 -  4 (a y ( l - 8 )  + 6<l>)
1,2 1 -------------- - ---
2
a = 6* + 6(1-6)
which are both negative provided all coefficients have their 
expected positive sign, however the possibility of a cyclical 
adjustment path, due to complex roots, does exist.
The equations of (6:23) can be written separately as:
(6:23') x = -(6^+6(1-8))x -8(ir -0 )a a a a
(6:23") n - y(B*+6(1-8))xa - y(l-8) (ir -0)a a a a
As in the previous model the restrictiveness of the monetary 
stance of the authorities can be assessed by looking at the gap 
between core inflation and the rate of monetary growth. The impact
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effect of this variable on the rates of change of output and core 
inflation remains the same as that in the earlier model but adjustment 
of the system will be faster due to the larger coefficients on 
average output.
The dynamics of the system in differences can be derived as
(6:24) *d
-(Bÿ+Ô) -B Xd 6
= +
*d 0 -y *d Y
This system has two stable roots -(3^+<5) and —y . Since 
-(BiJi+<5) is greater in absolute value than -Bij> adjustment of 
the system in differences is faster in this case than in the case 
of no real wage resistance.
6:5 Control simulations of the model with the real wage effect
The control simulations of section 6:3 showed little welfare 
loss from decentralised control. Indeed if there were any significant 
costs attached to implementing a cooperative solution then decentralised 
control would be likely to be the more efficient system. It is 
possible that this result will not hold when real wage resistance 
is a feature of the model. This is because the real wage effect 
provides a much richer source of interaction between the economies.
To examine this issue control simulations were run with parameters 
identical to those used previously except for the inclusion of a 
real wage term. Since OLN and CLN time paths have been found to 
be almost identical in the previous simulations, this section uses
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the OLN solution only to characterise uncoordinated behaviour. The 
loss functions of the policy authorities remain those specified 
in (6:14)
OLN and PE Simulations
For both simulations the parameter values are 
6 = * = Y = 0.5 qx = 3.8 - 1.0 r = 1.0
The real wage resistance coefficient 6 is assumed to 
have a value 0.5. The eigenvalues of the state-transition matrix 
under OLN control are:
-1.400903
-0.892846
-0.362065
-0.411880
There are no complex roots so the system should exhibit 
monotonic convergence. Table ten gives the time paths of the 
variables of interest. The model was also examined for the case 
9X = 15.2 but since the results are qualitatively similar these 
results are not presented here.
Under PE control the stable roots are
-1.364333
-0.970749
-0.388710
-0.364207
Table eleven gives the time paths of the variables of interest.
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Table Ten
OLN Control with Real Wage Resistance = 3.8
T x
0 100.00
1 96.21
2 95.94
3 96.67
4 97.52
5 98.24
6 98.79
7 99.18
8 99.45
9 99.63
10 99.75
ir e
10.00 -4.71
6.86 -0.15
4.64 1.44
3.11 1.50
2.08 1.22
1.38 0.81
0.92 0.63
0.61 0.43
0.40 0.29
0.27 0.20
0.18 0.13
w P
10.00 2.64
2.99 1.05
0.49 0.96
-0.28 0.61
-0.44 0.39
-0.39 0.21
-0.30 0.16
CMCMO 0.11
-0.15 0.07
-0.10 0.05
-0.07 0.03
w/p V Lo
.5000 100.00
.5098 71.96
.5104 43.93
.5086 23.42
.5063 11.54
.5044 5.42
.5031 2.48
.5021 1.12
.5014 0.49
.5009 0.22
.5006 0.09
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Table Eleven
PE Control with Real Wage Resistance q = 3.8
T x
0 100.00
1 96.38
2 96.12
3 96.78
4 97.55
5 98.22
6 98.73
7 99.11
8 99.37
9 99.56 
99.69
ir 0
10.00 -4.14
7.00 0.65
4.89 1.78
3.40 1.74
2.37 1.40
1.65 1.05
1.14 0.75
0.79 0.54
0.55 0.38
0.38 0.26
0.26 0.18
w P
10.00 2.93
3.32 1.98
0.93 1.36
0.13 0.94
-0,11 0.65
-0.15 0.45
-0.13 0.31
-0.10 0.22
-0.07 0.15
-0.05 0.10
-0.04 0.07
w/p Lt/Lo
.5000 100.00
.5188 71.97
.5202 44.75
.5166 24.77
.5125 12.87
.5091 6.46
.5064 3.19
.5045 1.56
.5031 0.75
.5022 0.37
.501510 0.18
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Even with the more powerful interaction effects deriving from 
real wage resistance there is still little evidence of a substantial 
difference between the OLN and PE time paths. There does seem to 
be a tendency to excessive contraction during the early stages for 
the OLN case, but the magnitude of this effect is not large.
Figure six compares the time paths under the two types of control.
The similarity of the OLN and PE solutions can be seen by 
comparison of the welfare losses over the interval zero to infinity. 
If the OLN loss is normalised as 100 then the PE loss is 98.99.
Again this indicates that a very small fraction of the welfare 
loss involved in controlling inflation can be avoided by coordination 
of policies. The similarity of the solutions can also be seen 
by comparing the feedback forms of the control rules, c.f. Table 12.
Table 12
OLN PE
Own output -.7737 -.7773
Foreign output -.1003 -.1854
Own inflation -.4118 -.4142
Foreign inflation -.0592 0
For the Pareto Efficient Controller this indicates a feedback 
control matrix which is very close to being block diagonal. This 
indicates a fairly natural decentralisation of policy or association 
of particular instruments with particular targets.
162
Although there is no significant gain through coordination 
in the model without real wage resistance or that incorporating 
it there is a significant gain in welfare due to the speeding up 
of the disinflation process through the introduction of the real 
wage effect. Taking the losses from the model without the real 
wage effect as 100 then the losses from the model with the effect 
are 48.94 for OLN and 49.17 for PE control.
6:6 Conclusions
This chapter has examined coordinated and uncoordinated policy 
regimes within the context of a more fully specified model than 
that used in chapter five. Although this has reduced the conciseness 
and tractability of the results it provides a richer understanding 
of the policy interaction between economies.
The numerical simulations considered have shown the existence 
of dynamic inefficiency due to uncoordinated control, though the 
magnitude of the effect has been rather small. This should not be 
generalised to imply that such welfare loss will always be negligible. 
The results derived are particular to the parameter values chosen 
and, more importantly, to the models examined. Both models 
considered assume that the exchange rate is determined by trade- 
flows only. A model in which the capital account had influence 
would lead to much faster and bigger movements in exchange rates.
This would lead to more severe policy coordination problems. Miller 
and Salmon (1984) derive some numerical results for such a model 
which show a more significant policy coordination problem than that 
found in this chapter.
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The results of this chapter should therefore be seen as providing 
confirmation that the results of chapter five are robust to relaxation 
of the strong assumptions of the model used in that chapter. They 
should not lead to the conclusion that policy interdependence 
will be an insignificant problem whatever the economic model considered. 1
1. Note that in contrast to the previous chapter the exchange 
rate is not subject to discrete jumps in this case.
This is because it is determined by relative output levels 
c.f. eqn. (A:5) and these in turn are not capable of jumping.
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Appendix A
In the main body of the chapter use was made of the equation 
* ' • * • * •p - e - p  » x  - x  (c.f. equation 6:8)). This is now proved 
as follows.
Consumers1 utility is assumed to be Cobb—Douglas in consumption 
levels of the commodities produced in the two countries, i.e.
(Al) Cd“‘
*l-a
d
Uf cfac
* 1 -0 1
f
Total production of the commodities is by definition equal 
to the sum of the consumption levels.
(A2) Cd + Cf
* *
Cd + Cf
Suppose consumers in the domestic economy have income M 
and those in the foreign economy have income M*. By a well known 
theorem Cobb-Douglas utility functions imply that the share of 
nominal expenditure on a product in total expenditure is given 
by the exponent on consumption of that product. This yields
(A3) PCd - aM and EP*C* - (l-a)M
aM* and EP* C* (l-a)EM*
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Rearranging this gives
(A4) P(Cd + Cf) - PX « a(M + EM*)
EP (Cd + Cf ) - EP*X* - (l-a)tM + EM*)
Taking ratios of nominal expenditures on the products yields
(A5) PX _ _a_
EP*X* l-a
or P a X*
EP* l-a X
or taking logs and differentiating with respect to time 
(A6) P - 4 - p* = ¿* - x
which is the required result.
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusion
The main theme of this thesis has been the inefficiency of 
uncoordinated national macroeconomic policies in an interdependent 
world economy. Two types of inefficiency have been considered.
The first of these arises when countries adopt incompatible targets. 
Chapter three considers an obvious example of this in which both 
countries in a two-country model desire a balance of payments 
surplus, this extended earlier work by Hamada. The second type of 
inefficiency arises when targets are compatible but failure to 
coordinate policy leads to an inefficient dynamic adjustment path 
towards the steady-state. This is referred to as dynamic inefficiency. 
Chapters five and six consider examples of this in which both countries 
in a two country model wish to bring inflation down to zero from 
an initially high level.
Non-cooperative behaviour has been modelled throughout as the 
Nash solution to a two player, non-zero sum game. Cooperative 
behaviour has been modelled as the solution corresponding to that 
chosen by a single controller whose objective function is a weighted 
average of the individual countries' objective functions. In 
chapter three the question of whether or not an improvement on the 
Nash solution could be achieved by allocating the role of Stackelberg 
leader to one country. This would have the advantage of maintaining 
the non-cooperative structure of the game. However, the superiority 
of the Stackelberg over the Nash solution was found to be ambiguous.
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Chapter five presented a simple model of an interdependent 
world economy. The policy instrument used by government to control 
inflation was assumed to be output (though an alternative inter­
pretation is that output is perfectly controllable by use of some 
intermediate monetary or fiscal instrument) . This rather strong 
assumption enabled tractable results to be derived for the model 
under control. These results indicated that the problem of coordination 
was more serious the greater the interdependence between the two 
countries. The main source of interdependence was the effect of 
variations in the ratio of outputs on the terms of trade.
Chapter six considered a more fully specified model of interacting 
economies which assumed that output adjusted sluggishly in response 
to changes in the monetary growth rate. Because of the increased 
complexity of the model numerical simulations were necessary to 
examine its behaviour. These confirmed that the analytical results 
of chapter five were robust to generalisation of the model. However, 
the welfare inefficiencies from decentralised control were surprisingly 
small. The models considered in chapter six focus on interaction 
through trade in goods only. If capital flows were to be introduced 
then it is possible that this would increase the welfare loss. Some 
indication of this can be obtained by consideration of the model 
in chapter five. There the welfare problems increased the more 
sensitive the real exchange rate was to changes in the output ratio.
If capital flows result in the kind of exchange rate overshooting 
discussed in chapter two then they would increase the return to 
coordination.
To conclude. This thesis has considered some topics in a 
potentially large area of research. Future research might involve
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